anti-circumvention provisions and the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs
on those claims.^892
On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, rejecting the defendants’ argument that their filters
did not “circumvent” technological measures. The court found the technological measure at
issue to be CoxCom’s pay-per-view delivery and billing system that scrambled pay-per-view
programming to make it not viewable unless subscribers chose to purchase it.^893 Without further
analysis, the First Circuit simply concluded: “A digital cable filter allows subscribers to ‘avoid’
or ‘bypass’ that technological measure. Given the factual record, we have little trouble
concluding that the district court properly granted summary judgment to CoxCom as to
appellants’ liability under the DMCA.”^894
(xi) The DISH Network Casesa. Dish Network v. SonicviewDISH Network transmitted encrypted programming signals that were then received by an
EchoStar receiver, which processed and decrypted the signals using data and encryption
technology stored in a DISH Network access card loaded into the receiver. The access card
communicated with the receiver to assure that only signals the subscriber was authorized to
received would be decrypted. DISH Network brought anti-circumvention claims against the
defendants, whom DISH Network alleged were involved in the manufacture of receivers,
software and other devices used to intercept and steal DISH Network’s encrypted signals. Upon
a motion for a TRO, the court ruled that DISH Network’s security access cards functioned as
both access controls and copyright controls, and that the defendants’ distribution of software files
through a website that allowed individuals to decrypt and view DISH Network content likely
violated both Section 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b)(1).^895
b. Dish Network v. SatFTAIn Dish Network v. SatFTA,^896 the court found the defendant liable under Section
1201(a)(2) for trafficking in circumvention devices that aided in circumvention of Dish
Network’s signal and content security measures in its receivers, including software that
facilitated the unauthorized re-programming of Dish Network smartcards, circuit diagrams that
could be used to build a connector to interface with the EEPROM in a Dish Network receiver to
erase the data created by Dish Network’s electronic countermeasures and continue receiving
unauthorized programming, and diagrams depicting the storage locations of data that secured
(^892) Id. at 106.
(^893) Id. at 110.
(^894) Id.
(^895) Dish Network L.L.C. v. Sonicview USA, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63429 at 2-3,7-8 (S.D. Cal. July 23,
2009).
(^896) 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25038 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011).