On appeal, the defendants challenged the jury instructions on contributory infringement
as erroneous because they “omitted both the elements of intent and material contribution.”^2060
Although the court agreed with the defendants that the jury instructions departed from the Ninth
Circuit Model Jury Instructions, it rejected the defendants’ challenge, noting that the court had
never held that an express finding of intent is necessary to support liability for contributory
infringement. Thus, the district court was not required to instruct the jury to make a separate
finding that the defendants’ knowing action evidenced intent to contribute to copyright
infringement. In addition, the court rejected the defendants’ argument that the jury instructions
should have required an express finding of material contribution. The court noted that material
contribution turns on whether the activity in question substantially assists direct infringement,
and here, there was no question that providing direct infringers with server space satisfied that
standard. Thus, the district court had not erred by narrowing the instruction on material
contribution to the only genuine question as to that element – whether the defendants provided
the3ir services to direct infringers.^2061
The court also rejected the defendants’ challenge to the court’s instructions on willful
infringement, on the ground that the instructions erroneously allowed the jury to find that the
defendants engaged in willful infringement based solely on a finding of knowing contribution to
direct infringement. The defendants claimed that under this formulation, a finding of willfulness
required proof of no element beyond those of contributory copyright infringement. The court
rejected this argument, noting that a finding of willfulness in the copyright context can be based
on either intentional behavior or merely reckless behavior or willful blindness to the copyright
holder’s rights. The jury instructions were adequate under this standard.^2062
Finally, the court determined that the jury’s award of statutory damages was erroneous.
The jury awarded statutory damages of $300,000 per defendant for willful contributory
infringement of two of Louis Vuitton’s copyrights. The court held that the jury verdict form
erroneously invited the jury to specify a separate statutory damages award against each
defendant.^2063 “Statutory damages reach a maximum based on the number of protected works,
not the number of defendants.”^2064 Accordingly, the court reversed the statutory damages award
and remanded with instructions that the district court award statutory damages in the total
amount of $300,000, for which the defendants would be jointly and severally liable.^2065
(^2060) Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2011).
(^2061) Id. at 943-44.
(^2062) Id. at 944.
(^2063) Id. at 946.
(^2064) Id. at 947.
(^2065) Id.