infringements did not constitute notification under Section 512(c)(3) with respect to pre-
litigation infringements claimed in the original complaint. Perfect 10 also cited Ressmeyer’s
letter to Zada that was copied to A9’s copyright agent Leblang. The court rejected this basis
also, noting that the letter did not indicate that Amazon forwarded any DMCA notices to A9 and
did not provide any information about the infringing material, so the letter alone did not establish
either that A9 received any of Perfect 10’s notices or that it had actual knowledge of specific
infringing activities available using its system.^2637
Perfect 10 argued that Amazon should be equitably estopped from asserting that Perfect
10 improperly sent its notices to Amazon because the Conditions of Use posted on Amazon’s
site allegedly instructed copyright owners to send DMCA notices regarding its affiliates directly
to Amazon. The court rejected this argument, noting that nowhere in the Conditions of Use did
Amazon purport to include A9 among its affiliates and Amazon’s filing with the Copyright
Office identifying the subsidiary entities for which Amazon’s copyright agent would accept
complaints did not include A9.^2638
Perfect 10 further argued that Amazon was the proper recipient of the notices because the
infringing activity took place through the A9 search box that was on the Amazon web site. The
court rejected this argument, holding that the presence of the search box on Amazon’s web site
did not make Amazon the proper recipient because A9 had designated its own copyright agent
and Zada knew that A9 was a separate corporation entity. Perfect 10 also contended that
Amazon was obligated to notify A9 of the alleged infringements because it owned and hosted
A9. The court also rejected this argument, noting Perfect 10 had cited no authority that would
require one OSP, by virtue of its ownership or hosting of another OSP, to pass along a DMCA
notice, where the two OSPs were distinct corporate entities and each had properly designated its
own copyright agent.^2639
Lastly, Perfect 10 argued that A9 had failed to comply fully with the requirements of
Section 512(c)(2) in designating a copyright agent because A9 had not provided an email address
for its copyright agent, but rather a URL for A9’s online complaint form. The court held that this
departure from the specific requirements of Section 512(c)(2) was inconsequential, and there was
no genuine dispute that the Copyright Office designation enabled anyone who saw it to contact
A9’s designated agent, through mail, fax, telephone, or the online complaint form. Accordingly,
the court ruled that A9 was entitled to a safe harbor under Section 512(c), and granted A9’s
motion for summary judgment as to contributory copyright infringement based on that safe
harbor.^2640
n. Louis Vuitton v. Akanoc Solutions(^2637) Id. at 13-15.
(^2638) Id. at 15-16.
(^2639) Id. at 17-18.
(^2640) Id. at 20-23.