164 ISLAM AT WAR
The Egyptian government, now a mere English puppet, was content to
allow the Sudan to drift away. Sadly, Muhammad Ahmad did not live to
enjoy his plunder. On June 28, 1885, he too passed away, and his empire
fell into the hands of Abd Allahi, who came to be known as the khalifa.
The new ruler of the recently liberated Sudanese state was a TaÛaisha
tribesman from the southwestern province of Darfur. He had been instru-
mental in the Mahdi’s army as the best of the generals, and so he became
khalifa, or supreme ruler. It was a difficult task. The Sudanese people had
been happy to throw off the corrupt foreigners, but in general they were
not amenable to the idea of a strong government—or any government at
all. Many of them, particularly those from the remote tribal areas in the
west, felt no loyalty outside of their own individual clans. To subdue and
gain their acceptance would be a long and arduous task for the khalifa. In
the end it would prove impossible. Likewise, as the administration of the
country came into his hands, he learned a thing that has bedeviled con-
querors since the dawn of history—it is far easier to kill and plunder than
it is to govern—a problem exacerbated by an uneducated, suspicious, and
jealous population, marginal industrial capability, and an isolated position
in the world. Resources were adequate to feed the people in a good year,
but little more. Sudan had nothing like the capability to produce modern
arms, and even to replace simple parts with adequate spares was beyond
Sudanese industrial ability. Perhaps the least of the khalifa’s problems was
that Ethiopia to the southeast was an aggressive neighbor. Much worse,
fairly regular expeditions were necessary to quell his own people. In short,
governing the Sudan was a difficult business, even with the spiritual bless-
ing of the mahdi.
For better or worse, the khalifa found himself warlord of a vast domain,
nearly a thousand miles from north to south, and close to that from east
to west. Although he lacked the spiritual pretensions of the mahdi, he
shared the dream of personal and supreme power. To inflict this dream on
his countrymen, the khalifa was forced into the normal choice of dicta-
tors—for officers he could appoint capable people with no particular rea-
son to be loyal, or hopefully loyal family members with no particular
ability. Both choices generally led to civil disorder, and thus the years
from 1885 to 1895 were spent in the suppression of various tribes. It is a
paradox that the Sudanese people had flocked to the mahdi’s standards to
avoid a corrupt yet lax and distant rule, but their victory had assured a
harsh and immediate government far more intrusive than the “Turk” from
Cairo had ever thought to be.
Under the khalifa, the Sudanese army became a well-organized force,
and much more of an army than a massed tribal array that it had earlier