MULLAHS AND MACHINE GUNS 167consisted of some 25,000 men. Bringing this weight of men, animals, and
machines down the Nile from Egypt relied on the superb engineers who
built a double-strand railway right across the desert and on the excellent
boating skills of the flotillas that kept supplies flowing and gunboats mo-
bile, even through the Nile’s five difficult cataracts between Aswan and
Berber. General H. H. Kitchener, one of the ablest soldiers of the day, led
the entire force.
As the Anglo-Egyptian army advanced, the weaknesses of the Khalifa’s
Sudan became apparent. Of the mighty army of 100,000 well-trained and
disciplined soldiers, probably more than a quarter were needed to keep
the provinces of the Khalifa’s state in check. More had been lost in fighting
against the Ethiopians at Gallabat, and the loyalty of the rest was such
that the Khalifa hesitated to reinforce his northern contingents with men
from the Omdurmanrubs.With so little opposition, the Allies required
no defense of the strategic cataracts, and the logistical support to continue
the advance was assured.
The Emir Mahmud, with a small army, was dispatched to contest the
enemy advance by threatening their flank from Atbara. Along the way,
Mahmud massacred the inhabitants of Metemma, because they had re-
fused the Khalifa’s orders. The Allies saw Mahmud’s 7,000 men as an
isolated detachment and hardly a threat. They simply marched against the
Atbara force and destroyed it on April 6, 1898. Of Mahmud’s army, only
the resourceful Osman Digna and his troops evaded the death trap. It was
an excellent small victory for Kitchener’s troops and did much to solidify
the confidence that the Egyptian troops now enjoyed.
The Anglo-Egyptians continued their methodical advance down the
river, scarcely pausing as their gunboats blasted the flimsy mud forts that
attempted to bar their passage. By August, the end was in sight. The
Khalifa still enjoyed the services of a large armed force—variously esti-
mated as between 40,000 and 50,000. This army was concentrated near
Omdurman, the capital, and as the enemy grew closer, he offered battle
on September 2, 1898, near the village of Karari, just five miles north of
Omdurman.
Sadly, the Khalifa ignored the sage advice of his best generals, notably
Osman Digna, and chose a disastrous plan of attack. Although an attack
by night would have neutralized much of the enemy firepower, he chose
to advance at dawn. Likewise, the enemy army would be much more liable
to attack if it was caught on the march. The Khalifa chose to attack so
early that the enemy was still in its fortified night position. Thus, at first
light Ibrahim al Khalil led some 5,000 well-trained riflemen forward to
attack the southern wing of Kitchener’s army. An hour later, Uthman