174 ISLAM AT WAR
and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The skill at arms had not only
disappeared, but warfare had changed markedly. It was now necessary for
generals to understand multidimensional, combined arms operations.
Modern weapons could be purchased and fielded, but the Muslim armies
formed after World War II were unable to employ them to their greatest
efficiency because they lacked the trained officer cadre necessary to max-
imize the lethal effect produced by a combination of infantry, artillery,
armor, and aircraft.
The one notable exception was the Arab Legion, formed and com-
manded by Lieutenant General Sir John Bagot Glubb during World War
II. The Legion was actually a small modern army, well trained in the
British military tradition and heavily officered by British mercenary of-
ficers. In a parallel process, the Turkish army in World War I had operated
at a degree higher than might have otherwise been expected because su-
preme command of the Ottoman forces had been given to General Liman
von Sanders, a professional German officer.
During the Israeli War of Independence (1948), the newborn Israeli
army had the benefit of numerous Jews who had trained and served under
the British in World War II. It also benefited from many Jewish officers
from the American and British armies that joined the struggle of the new
nation. These trained officers and NCOs fused their civilian volunteers
into a well-organized, if wildly undisciplined, army. The Jewish forces
were further strengthened by the knowledge that to lose the war meant
the destruction of their newly formed but long-awaited homeland.
In contrast, the Muslim states, with no remaining military class in their
society depended on mass armies drafted from those parts of society with
no military tradition. Most were not led by officers with the necessary
skill base to fully utilize their weapons systems, let alone train their sol-
diers in the use of the new devices. The officers were equally unknow-
ledgeable in tactics and the motivation to win at any cost visible amongst
the Jews was far less evident in the Muslim armies.
In May 1948 the Egyptians attacked the Jewish village of Kfar Darom,
which was defended by only thirty Jewish settlers. This battle would
clearly demonstrate the awkwardness of the new Egyptian Army. With an
overwhelming combined arms force of infantry and artillery, the Egyp-
tians should have had an easy victory—but they did not. As the Egyptian
infantry attacked, the Egyptian artillery barrage fell on their own troops,
shattering their attack and morale. The frightened Egyptian infantry fled,
leaving seventy dead and wounded on the battlefield. The Egyptian artil-
lery had mastered loading and firing the guns, but they had not mastered
the process of aiming the guns or coordinating fire with the advancing