MULLAHS AND MISSILES 179plans for an attack on Israel. Even the moderate King Hussein of Jordan
was obliged to join rather than face charges of being pro-Israeli.
Combined, the three nations began slow preparations that eventually
provoked an overwhelming Israeli preemptive strike. It is ironic that the
Syrians acted aggressively but feared an Israeli response. By joining with
the Egyptians, Syria guaranteed what it most feared. When war came,
Syria was still far from prepared to successfully prosecute it. Again, as in
both earlier wars, the Arab forces, while numerous on paper, had little
fighting value.
The Israeli air force launched a series of attacks on Egyptian airfields
that utterly destroyed the Egyptian air force. They then turned their atten-
tion on the Syrian and Jordanian air forces, destroying them in turn. Nei-
ther Soviet aircraft, nor Soviet antiaircraft missiles were effective in the
hands of the poorly trained Arab forces. The well-trained Israeli military,
using modern Western equipment demonstrated an essential truth of mod-
ern warfare—modern machines can direct and deliver massive firepower
accurately, but only if their crews can master the machines.
The Israeli air staff had carefully planned these attacks on the Egyptian
air force. Intelligence had determined the specific hour when the bulk of
the Egyptian staff and pilots would be on the road between breakfast and
their bases and designated that as the optimal time to attack. The results
were devastating and gave the Israelis absolute air superiority. This ex-
cellent staff and intelligence work was possible for the well-educated Is-
raeli forces, but not for the Arabs.
On the ground, Israeli armored forces rolled forward with equal pre-
cision. Their armored leaders had all trained at the U.S. armor school.
Numerous additional officers had trained in various European military
schools, including the French Ecole de Guerre. In contrast, few of the
Egyptian, Syrian, or Jordanian officers had any such training. This would
soon become apparent when the Israelis won every tank-versus-tank bat-
tle, employing fire, movement, support, and communication at levels that
their opponents could not counter or duplicate.
In preparation for their pending attack, the Egyptians had heavily for-
tified the Sinai frontier, playing to their greatest strength—the defense. A
frontal attack against these forts would have been a bloody affair. The
Egyptians had, unfortunately, thought that areas of sand dunes would be
impassable to Israeli armored columns. The Israelis knew otherwise and
repeatedly turned Egyptian positions.
The Egyptian plan had failed, and once it became apparent that the
situation was changed, the Egyptians showed themselves incapable of
reacting spontaneously to the new situation. This and the repeated success