MULLAHS AND MISSILES 201laurels of victory had passed to the Northern Alliance. Each Northern
Alliance step toward Kabul as it swept south was seen as a further sign
of Allah’s favor and even more tribes and commanders joined the Alliance
forces. In a more basic sense, the process of shifting alliances might be
summarized as, “It is better to pick the corpse than to be the corpse, even
if its previous occupant is now in paradise.” This is a clear demonstration
of how fragile any system of alliances has been in Afghanistan and how
fragile they likely will continue to be until the people of Afghanistan
evolve away from their tribal roots.
If one steps back and examines the U.S. campaign plan, it was an
incredibly subtle exploitation of the Islamic perception of God being on
the side of the victor when the victor is a Muslim. Had the United States
landed troops and launched a ground attack on the Taliban, they would
have simply melted into the mountains, declared a jihad, and by definition
had God on their side. Attacked by infidels, they would not lose face or
the support of their allied tribes, because God cannot be, by definition, on
the side of an infidel.
On the other hand, the Taliban could not withdraw in the face of the
Muslims of the Northern Alliance, even under the pressure of U.S. bomb-
ing. To do so would be political suicide. If the Taliban moved away in
order to escape the air attacks they would appear beaten by the Northern
Alliance, which actually happened.
Knowing this, the Taliban troops remained in their positions, locked in
place not by the military prowess of the Northern Alliance, but by their
own cultural imperatives—to back away is to surrender God to your en-
emy. As a result, the Taliban stood as U.S. air power bombed them into
oblivion.
Stationary Taliban military forces were ground down and blasted into
nothing. When the morale of the survivors was so shaken by the hand of
God, in the form of cluster bombs, Daisy Cutters, and carpet-bombing,
the Taliban was incapable of resisting the military pressure of the Northern
Alliance. Some Taliban defected to the Northern Alliance soldiers to es-
cape the terrible weight of explosives showered on them by naval bombers
and B-52s. Others melted into the mountains and desert. When the Taliban
army vanished, the Northern Alliance, with God now on its side, drove
forward. With every step south it took, tribe after tribe came to offer fealty
to God’s designated victors. Like a train rolling downhill, the Alliance
gained irresistible momentum.
Another factor is the average Afghani’s hatred of the Taliban. The Tal-
iban was supported by large numbers of non-Afghans: Arabs and Pakis-
tanis. The Arabs were simply foreign devils, as any other non-Afghan
would be perceived, but the Pakistanis occupy a place of particular hatred