MULLAHS AND MISSILES 203backwardness mirrored by their societies. In the Balkan War of 1912–13,
the Bulgarians, who were about as backward a European nation as one
could imagine at that time, proved themselves militarily superior to the
Turkish army, despite the long Turkish military tradition. During the
course of World War I the Turks proved themselves generally incapable
of anything but a stubborn defense against the western armies. The few
bright moments were mostly brought about because of the presence of
German officers.
After World War II, the only Muslim successes in 1948 were, again,
when their troops were led by the British officers of the Arab Legion.
Through the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars the Arabs proved
themselves vastly inferior to the Israelis, despite their huge numerical and
equipment superiority. They moved about clumsily when attempting an
offensive. Once their initial plan was completed or went awry, they were
bewildered by the changed circumstances and appeared to have little con-
cept of what to do next. This was most notable in 1973 after the Egyptians
had breached the Israeli Suez Canal defenses.
Some Muslim armies did have a flare for the defense and could be
formidable on those occasions, but once their leadership was killed or its
morale broken, they generally decamped in great haste. They could op-
erate in a static war of attrition. In the Iran-Iraq war the Iraqis clearly
recognized their inability to maintain an offensive against the vastly su-
perior Iranian forces arrayed before them, fell back on the defense, and
proceeded to slaughter thousands of Iranian soldiers. The Iranians—once
their small Western-trained, professional army was bled white—had no
skill at the offense, but they certainly demonstrated a willingness to accept
huge and needless casualties.
The Russian invasion of Afghanistan faced a guerrilla war. Here, the
Islamic warriors avoided pitched battle and fell back on the techniques of
ambush and mountain warfare where the prowess of the individual and
small groups were familiar keys. They did not attempt to conscript large
numbers of civilians into their war bands, nor to mold them into soldiers
as the Egyptians, Syrians, Iranians, and Iraqis had done in their wars in
the latter half of the twentieth century. Instead, they relied on the natural
Afghan proclivity for war based on tribal military tradition. They were
also reinforced by both their hatred of foreign invaders and the religious
imperative to defend their homeland from infidels. Their success can be
ascribed to many issues: the lack of real dedication on the part of the
Russians to pursue the war, financial support from the rest of the Muslim
world, and the introduction of superior technical weaponry from the
United States in the form of Stinger missiles that checked Russian close