20 ISLAM AT WAR
For the residents of Hira, though, the situation was also difficult. Al-
though the townspeople could defend their walls, they could not cope with
the Muslims in open battle—and so they could not protect the surrounding
farms and villages. These farms were the food supply for the city, and if
they stayed in enemy hands, the city would starve or be forced to capit-
ulate. The best solution, of course, would be relief by a mobile Persian
army. The disarray of the Persian government made that unlikely.
With both sides well aware of their own weaknesses, a compromise
was in order. Hira surrendered to the point that tribute was collected and
a tax set to be paid. But the city fathers were unwilling to convert to Islam.
They were Christians, and that faith they kept.
Khalid’s skill as a general becomes apparent when one examines his
actions at the Battle of the River of Blood, and the Siege of Hira. He could
be murderous, and he could be generous. Neither or both could be said to
be his character. Ultimately, the desert warrior had the flexibility of mind
to adapt the course that would best further his goal. Modern military
theorists consider this the “maintenance of the objective.” The uneducated
desert warrior had an inherent understanding of strategic concepts.
In September Khalid’s force moved a few miles north and captured the
walled city of Anrab by the novel expedient of filling its moat with the
bodies of its weakest camels. In December 633 the Arab army moved
back into the desert to deal with yet another threat to their desert lines of
communication mounted by Arab tribes more northern than those crushed
at the Battle of the Blood River. These tribes were either unaware of the
Blood River battle or unimpressed by it. With the aid of a small Persian
garrison they threatened to cut Khalid’s line of retreat, and he turned back
to the west to deal with them at Ain el Tamr.
The Arab general was generous in most dealings with the Persian cities
that he occupied, but he was ruthless with the nomads who opposed him.
After this victory, all of the losers were slaughtered and their families
were sold into slavery. In this instance, it served Khalid’s needs to secure
his line of retreat, and he annihilated anyone who threatened it.
This was the Khalid’s last victory over the Persians. His original instruc-
tions from Caliph Abu Bekr had been to eliminate opposition in the Arabian
Peninsula. He had exceeded that authority by his attacks on the Persian
Empire. While he had been attacking one giant in the east, the caliph’s main
interest lay to the north and the invasion of Byzantine Syria. In December
633 Khalid was recalled to assist the Muslim main effort, where his military
genius would shine yet again.
The new commander of the Arab forces opposing Persia, was Mu-
thanna, a tribal sheik of the Beni Bekr, from central Arabia. It is probably