26 ISLAM AT WAR
province for so many years. Whatever the reasons, the Byzantine target
was always first in the eyes of the caliphs, and it was always the front to
which the recruits clamored to be sent. It will be remembered that Khalid’s
first attacks on the Persians had been little more than a casual extension
of his campaign to reduce the apostasy that followed Muhammad’s death.
Byzantium was always the main enemy from the day Muhammad had
consolidated power in Arabia.
Abu Bekr dispatched the first real invasion in the winter of 633–34.
Three columns, led by Amr ibn al Aasi, Yezeed ibn abi Sofian, and Shur-
ahbil ibn Hasana marched north in a three-pronged attack. Shurahbil was
to take the coastal plain to the west of the Dead Sea, Yezeed was to move
up the east side of the same sea, and Amr was to strike into southern
Palestine in the direction of Gaza, from farther east yet.
This opening campaign closely mirrored the Arab attacks against the
Persians. They first met and defeated the tribal buffers that the empire had
erected, and then moved on cautiously. The raiders kept their backs to the
desert when facing heavy opposition. As on the Persian front, they had
little difficulty with the local defense forces, and used their mobility to
strike when and where they chose. While there was no Euphrates River
to hold back the Muslims, the Byzantines did manage to field an army
that held off the small raiding armies. This army held the Arabs at bay
near Deraa, and although outflanked by Khalid, kept the enemy out of
Damascus during the winter and into the spring of 634.
With the Arabs halted in the west, the Byzantines prepared a counter-
blow, and a clever one. A large field army was assembled from the gar-
risons of Syria and Palestine—probably reinforced by troops moved by
sea from the central army—and marched down the coastal route. The
Byzantine plan was to strike Amr’s army before it could be reinforced
from the main Muslim force stalled at Deraa. The imperial force could
then isolate the main Arab armies from supplies and reinforcements ar-
riving from the south. This plan was much a part of Heraclius’s traditional
strategy of using defenses to hold an enemy while launching an attack in
an unexpected quarter. It might well have worked, but the Emperor was
fighting against Khalid, arguably the greatest desert warrior of all time.
While the imperial force, commanded by Theodorus, the Emperor’s
brother, marched south, Khalid led the main Arab forces south and the
east of the Dead Sea. They crossed to the west at the Pass of Moab. In
spite of their longer march, the Arabs arrived to bolster Amr’s force before
the fight took place. This rapid movement was typical of the Muslim
armies, and the slow pace of the Byzantines was, and remains, symptom-
atic of sophisticated military forces. The Byzantine army drawing on the