Notes to pp. 275–278 553older music and polished it up. See GS, vol. 12, p. 10f.; cf. also Giselher
Schubert, ‘Adornos Auseinandersetzung mit der Zwölftontechnik
Schönbergs’, p. 242ff.; Martin Hufner, Adorno und die Zwölftontechnik,
p. 111ff.
10 Adorno, The Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 53.
11 Ibid., p. 54.
12 Ibid., p. 59.
13 Ibid., p. 73.
14 Ibid., p. 60.
15 Ibid., p. 67.
16 Ibid., p. 65. Martin Hufner points out that Adorno had ‘recognized earlier
on that “the rationality of twelve-tone technique” “organizes” the natural
material, but “undialectically” regards this process as that of the emancipa-
tion of man from the coercions of nature. In The Philosophy of Modern
Music, he draws attention to the reverse side of this process of emancipa-
tion’ (Martin Hufner, Adorno und die Zwölftontechnik, p. 120).
17 Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 117.
18 Ibid., p. 71 (translation amended).
19 Ibid., pp. 118 and 123.
20 Ibid., p. 30.
21 Adorno and Krenek, Briefwechsel, p. 133.
22 Modifications of twelve-tone methods can be seen in the Four Songs
based on Poems by Stefan George for Voice and Piano, op. 7, which were
completed in 1944. In the fourth poem, for example, he divided the row
into three four-note groups, and at the same time the sequence of the
notes is not fixed. See Martin Hufner, Adorno und die Zwölftontechnik,
pp. 139ff. and 168. In a letter to Eduard Steuermann some six years after
the publication of The Philosophy of Modern Music, Adorno claimed that
‘one must attempt to forgo all “ties”; one must try to make the experience
of twelve-tone technique useful to the listener, but at the same time one
must free oneself from the tyranny of the row, not to mention everything
else’ (Adorno to Steuermann, 14 October 1955, in Rolf Tiedemann,
Adorno-Noten, p. 52).
23 Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 126.
24 Ibid., p. 128.
25 Ibid., p. 133.
26 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 256.
27 Ibid., p. 219.
28 Horkheimer, Briefwechsel, GS, vol. 17, p. 153. Schmid Noerr rightly
points out that ‘gestures taken from concepts’ does not ‘refer to the sub-
liminal connotations that promote communication, but, on the contrary, it
is a reference to the practice of life in its totality within which discursive
language, especially that of academic disciplines, is a factor that (necessar-
ily) entails abstraction’ (Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, Gesten aus Begriffen:
Konstellationen der kritischen Theorie, p. 68).
29 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 218.
30 Ibid., p. 30.
31 See Jürgen Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, p. 146;
Norbert Rath, ‘Zur Nietzsche-Rezeption Horkheimers und Adornos’,
p. 73; Hauke Brunkhorst, ‘Die Welt als Beute’, p. 154ff.