Adorno

(Tina Sui) #1
Notes to pp. 428– 430 599

Universitätsbibliothek, Frankfurt am Main; cf. also Rolf Wiggershaus, The
Frankfurt School, p. 565ff. In Negative Dialectics Adorno took up the
image of the eater and the bread in a slightly different form. There he was
arguing against thought relying too much on a particular standpoint. If
critical theory is asked to produce a standpoint, ‘it would be that of the
diner regarding the roast. Experience lives by consuming the standpoint;
not until the standpoint is submerged in it would there be philosophy’
(Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 30); cf. also Adorno, ‘Anmerkungen zum
philosophischen Denken’, GS, vol. 10.2, p. 599ff.
84 Adorno, ‘On Subject and Object’, Critical Models, p. 254.
85 Ibid. (translation changed).
86 Adorno, Philosophische Terminologie, vol. 1, pp. 86, 94 and 133.
87 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 17f.
88 Ibid., p. 163.
89 Ibid.
90 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, p. 192. For Weber,
the ideal type has ‘the meaning of a pure ideal marginal concept...by
which reality can be measured in order to clarify particular significant
components of its empirical content with which it is being compared’
(ibid., p. 194). Whether the construction of an ideal type is intellectually
productive cannot be decided in advance, but can be ascertained only by
the success with which ‘the ideal type has facilitated the cognition of
concrete manifestations of culture in their context, their causal condition-
ing and their meaning’ (ibid., p. 193). The formation of ideal types arises
from ‘the one-sided intensification of one or more points of view and
through the confluence of a plethora of individual phenomena that join
those one-sided points of view to form a unified intellectual structure’
(ibid., p. 191). ‘Intensification’ means that specific characteristics are singled
out and brought together in a concept with greater clarity.
91 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 53.
92 Adorno, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, p. 44.
93 Max Weber introduced the idea of value freedom or ethical neutrality
in science in 1909 in order to make a strict distinction between ‘is’ and
‘ought’. Value judgements cannot be established with empirical methods.
An empirical science must treat social and cultural values as the objects of
cognition. It must limit itself to stating the means that can be employed
to achieve specific ends, and to describing their consequences. Over and
above this, the social sciences are in a particularly good position to shed
light on a consciousness of desired values. The researcher’s choice of
subject is dictated and limited by his own values. For this reason, Weber
thought that it was important for scholars to reflect upon their own values
in order to eliminate bias.
94 Adorno, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, p. 59.
95 See also Adorno, ‘Critique’, Critical Models, p. 281ff.; Stefan Müller-
Doohm, ‘Kritik in kritischen Theorien’, p. 71ff.
96 Adorno, Introduction to Sociology, p. 85f.
97 Adorno, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, p. 66.
98 Adorno, Ontologie und Dialektik, NaS, vol. 7, p. 147.
99 Adorno began to write down his critique of Heidegger in summer 1951.
‘The radical gesture, combined with the total absence of any socially

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