shared news reports on daily developments from private, reliable sources;
they arranged the complicated logistics of safely transmitting funds so that
the money would not fall into the hands of Russian officials; they carefully
monitored collections while urging an equitable response from all Western
countries; they sent Paul Nathan and two others on a fact-finding mission
to the stricken areas; and they considered provisions for children orphaned
by the pogroms. Seeking a united Jewish front, Schiff criticized the Alli-
ance Israélite Universelle, which, out of frustration that it could not con-
trol operations, remained aloof. The spectacle of even partial international
unity was impressive, but Schiff and the NCRSRM never forgot the Amer-
ican pressures on them. Sensitive to popular restrictionist sentiment, they
turned down participation in an international conference lest it raise the
specter of a significant wave of refugee immigrants. And although victims
appealed directly for funds with which to immigrate, they refused to coun-
tenance induced or assisted immigration.^45
Schiff’s British associates simultaneously pressed him to seek
Roosevelt’s intercession. On December 5, Montagu wired: “Do you think
your President would... initiate identical notes of great powers asking for
equal rights for Jews so as to prevent outrages in the future?” Both Schiff
and Oscar Straus were in touch with the State Department and the White
House, but whereas Straus was determined to shield Roosevelt from what
he considered impossible demands, Schiff knew no such limits. He agreed
that a joint international remonstrance was impossible, but as he wrote the
president, something had to be done to prevent further slaughter. Hinting
at the use of force against Russia, he reminded Roosevelt of American hu-
manitarian intervention in Cuba: “If you personally then felt so strongly in
this regard that you willingly took your life into your hands to help to pre-
vent the oppression of the Cuban people... is it not in the face of the hor-
rors now occurring in Russia, and which its very Government declares it is
powerless to prevent, the duty of the civilized world to intervene?” Term-
ing Schiff’s request “hysterical,” Roosevelt dismissed it out of hand. Not
only was diplomatic pressure useless when a country was gripped by revo-
lution, but the United States could not be the policeman for the rights of
ethnic groups like Armenians or Jews. Empty threats without a readiness to
go to war had no effect; as the saying went, “Never draw unless you mean
to shoot.” Perhaps impressed by reports on Russian Jewish revolutionary
activity from his friend the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, Sir Cecil
Spring-Rice (never a philo-Semite), Roosevelt also warned that a show of
force could boomerang against American as well as Russian Jews.^46
Independently, Schiff carried American Jewish protests to high Russian
quarters. In communication with Witte, he reminded the prime minister of
his assurances at Portsmouth and warned of a mass exodus from Russia if
Witte’s government failed to emancipate the Jews. In that event, he pre-
142 Jacob H. Schiff