who bitterly criticized them for succumbing to “mob rule,” in the opposi-
tion. The banker was unhappy at the prospect, but, as in business, the situ-
ation demanded that the stewards cut their losses. Communal unity was
the desired end, and if participation in a congress achieved that unity,
checked the so-called mischief makers, and assured the continued viability
of the committee, so be it. Flexibility allowed the AJC to reach a settlement
with the congress partisans in the summer of 1916. Although it had yielded
to the majority on the basic issue, it won significant concessions: first,
agreement that the American Jewish Congress was only a temporary or-
ganization and, second, changes in the wording of the congress platform in
order to make it more palatable to non-Zionists. At President Wilson’s
suggestion and to Schiff’s satisfaction, it was also agreed to postpone the
congress until after the war. When the congress proceeded to elect Schiff
as its treasurer and to its committee on foreign correspondence, and com-
mittee members Marshall and Harry Cutler as two of its vice presidents, it
proved that the supporters of democratic governance had never intended
to dispense with the stewards.^97
The AJC quickly regained the initiative. At the peace conference it was
Marshall who, for all intents and purposes, led the international Commit-
tee of Jewish Delegations in the fight for minority rights. He and Adler (as
the special representative of the AJC) were better prepared on the Euro-
pean Jewish condition and more skilled than their erstwhile opponents in
the ways of diplomatic lobbying. Not only were they pivotal in bridging
the differences among delegations, but they presented the face of a united
American Jewry when they argued the case of minority rights for Jews in
eastern Europe. The strategy of joining the congress if it proved unbeat-
able appeared amply justified, and success at Versailles bolstered in turn
the image of the AJC in America. While Marshall and Adler were at Ver-
sailles, Schiff watched the peacemaking process from America. Now rec-
onciled to the congress, he helped to defray its costs and, in a typical
Schiff-like gesture, offered to cover 10 percent of expenses incurred by
needy delegates.^98
Much is revealed about Schiff in the congress episode—his energy and per-
sistence, his readiness to take on opponents publicly, and a pride in his
record of communal service. The dispute also showed a sensitivity to criti-
cism and a need of appreciation. Just as he called Asch for a meeting, so did
he keep careful tabs on other well-known Jews. Answering their arguments
or acknowledging their praise, he expected public support from his close as-
sociates. Throughout the public wrangling, Schiff preferred to operate in-
dependently. In his addresses and his dealings with Brandeis he spoke for
himself and never as the agent of the AJC. Ignoring any restraints imposed
The World at War 223