The architecture of humanism; a study in the history of taste

THE ETHICAL FALLACY

155

appoints. Butwhen

we

are

familiarwithit,andhave

ceaseddesiringtobeshocked,thisisnolongerthecase.

Itscritics,infact,complainofthebaroquethatinit

theyencounterdeceittoooften;thecauseofthecom-

plaintisthattheyhavenotencountereditenough.

Morally, then.

Renaissance

*

deceit' is justified.

It doesnotfollow onthataccount
thatasthetically

itis always
equallytobe admitted. If

'

deceit' is

carriedbeyondacertainpoint,weceasetogetarchi-

tectureandfindstage
decoration. Thereisnothing

wrongaboutstagedecoration
;

in itsplace there is

notevenanything aestheticallyundesirable. It has

asoledefect: thatitfails—andmustfailinevitably

—

^togiveusahighsenseofpermanenceand

strengtly'

Butthesearequalitieswhichareappropriate,above

1'

allothers,in
a

monumental

art

;

qualities,therefore,

which

we have a

right to

expect in architecture.

Here,then, issomejustificationforthe theorythat

thedegreeofpretenceisimportant. True, itisim-

portant
aesthetically,

and notmorally,butit isim-

portant. Butthenthebaroquestylehadthe most

penetratingsenseof

thisimportance. Itrecognised

thatthelibertyto pretend

—

^which the

Renaissance

hadclaimed from thebeginning

—

^though

unlimited

inprinciple,mustbe

subjectinpractice tothecon-

ditionsofeachparticularproblem

thatthearchitect

might
undertake.

Itwasaquestionof

psychology.

The scope of architecture,

in a period as keenly