duct. The issue of the ceiling radiator was important for Aalto. The matter was resolved
to Aalto’s satisfaction, and the ceiling radiators were installed. Aalto was, again, able
to convince the experts of the State Medical Board of the technical feasibility of this
option and won over the Building Board by referring to the attitude of the State Medical
Board. The initiative to use ceiling radiators came originally from the engineering firm
Radiator, which was not finally selected as the contractor despite Aalto’s great efforts.
Aalto felt that morally he owed the contract to Radiator, as they had helped him by pro-
viding advice on the options for, and innovations in, various water, drainage and heating
pipe and ventilation systems. The Building Board eventually selected another contractor
based on a narrow price margin, which brought the fruitful design collaboration between
Radiator and Aalto to an end. So the ceiling radiators installed were in the end those that
were already available on the market, instead of having Aalto design his own radiators
for that purpose. He had clear interest in concentrating his attention on the function of
ceiling radiators. In this sense, the design solution was not holistic, a fact to which the
Spanish researcher Mateo Closa has also previously drawn attention. The heating unit
mounted on the ceiling was therefore unfinished in its architectural treatment.
In my view, this episode is a telling case that shows the importance of collaborative
effort in a building project. Latour refers to strong networks formed by social and material
actants that together possess the capacity to act. In this case, selecting the “wrong” con-
tractor destroyed a viable collaborative pattern, in Latour’s terms a hybrid, so the innova-
tion process was interrupted and the new technological solution remained undeveloped.
The wavering position of the Building Board in initiating a robust design of the
installation systems also proves the importance of interaction in the design and con-
struction of a building. In the case of Paimio Sanatorium, the installation systems, for
example the sewage system, was not developed concurrently with the architectural
development of the building. A real ventilation plan was never devised, and it simply
emerged as a side product of the heating system.
A technological process benefits from inspiring ideas that are tested and subse-
quently adjusted. The story of Paimio Sanatorium reveals that the water, sewage and
heating pipe systems alongside the electrical and ventilation installations were relatively
new to Aalto, and he lacked the capacity to manage their design without the input
of specialists. More importantly, Aalto did not think to insist on engaging an expert
in the process, who would have been familiar with district infrastructure systems at a
sufficiently early stage. Demanding such expertise would have required, first of all, that
Aalto himself would have understood the importance of these systems and, secondly,
that he would have had sufficient authority to make such demands. Successful solutions
require strong and viable hybrids. Not all of the blame can be put on the Building
Board or a rigid organisation; Aalto was also guilty of undermining his own power to
secure the contract with Radiator, having alienated the Building Board by taking such
an intrusive role in the selection of the concrete frame contractor. Aalto had lost some of
the Building Board’s trust in his position heading his first major contract negotiations.