The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (W W Norton & Company; 1998)

(Nora) #1

(^474) THE WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS
had built their own devices). Automobiles were taken apart and
checked inside and out before they might be sold to consumers. Once,
vexed by increasing imports of French skis, the Japanese tried to ex­
clude them on the pretext that Japanese snow was different. The
French responded by threatening to exclude Japanese motorcycles on
the ground that French roads were different. Understood; the Japan­
ese dropped their plans.
All of these vexations testify to a sly cunning, of a sort to permit in­
definite delays, evasions, and flip-flops, and always with politely straight
face. More serious in the long run are business ties and social expecta­
tions that exclude shopping for cheaper imports. The Japanese do not
think of the market as an open space. It consists of enclosures, and
business people who violate the boundaries will be warned that when
and if such imports should be unavailable, the maverick bargain hunter
will not find Japanese suppliers ready to help out.
What kinds of imported manufactures do get in? Primarily prestige
brands, typically linked to national specializations: Scotch whisky,
French cognac, Belgian and Swiss chocolates, Vuitton luggage, Patek
and Rolex watches, Italian designer clothing—the sort of thing that
makes a statement, whether as gift or conspicuous marker of success.
All of Japan's big department stores have separate boutiques for these
items: a country ready to spend a hundred dollars for a supermelon
with ribbon attached can afford to spoil itself. No room, though, for
Kodak film; the Japanese have their own Fuji brand—and Japanese
light is different.
This mercantilist policy has aroused indignation among trading
"partners" and puzzlement among economists. Don't the Japanese
understand that such a policy is a deliberate impoverishment of their
own population, who pay that much more for what they buy? No one
would call the Japanese fools, even if they do occasionally make mis­
takes. Don't they understand comparative advantage? Don't they know
that free trade promotes growth and wealth?
To these rhetorical questions, the Japanese reply that the end of eco­
nomic policy is not low prices and discount distribution. The goal is
market share, increased capacity, industrial and military strength.* Pro-



  • On the technological links in Japan between industrial development and military
    strength, see especially Samuels, aRich Nation, Strong Army." The one thing I would
    add to his analysis is the role of export-oriented manufacture in expanding industrial
    capacity. The Japanese have not forgotten the strategic consequences of their relative
    industrial weakness in World War II.

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