Congressional politics 139of the filibuster that was conducted by a handful of Senators against a pro-
posal to arm American merchant ships, a closure rule was introduced. The
present rule, adopted in 1975, provides for closure of a debate if three-fifths
of the entire Senate vote for it, that is sixty Senators. Before 1975 a vote of
two-thirds of the Senators present and voting was required to end debate, so
that just over one-third of the Senate could prevent the passage of a bill if
they were determined enough. Senators are reluctant to vote for closure, and
filibusters have been difficult to prevent. Between 1917 and 1975 closure mo-
tions were introduced 104 times, but only twenty-four filibusters were ended
in this way. The new rule made it easier to end debate, but still gave a deter-
mined minority a good deal of power. The final blow to President Clinton’s
unsuccessful attempt to reform the health care system was the threat that a
filibuster would be mounted to prevent the passage of the legislation.
Filibusters, and threats to filibuster, are very much alive today. In 2003 and
2004 Democratic senators used the filibuster to block a number of President
Bush’s nominations for judgeships in federal appellate courts. A number
of contentious issues, such as immigration control and stem cell research,
provoke threats of filibusters. However, in January 2006 an attempt by Demo-
cratic Senators, led by John Kerry and Edward Kennedy, to mount a filibuster
against the confirmation of Samuel Alito as a Supreme Court Justice failed,
and the Senate voted to close debate on the nomination by seventy-two votes
to twenty-five. Nineteen Democratic senators joined the Republican majority
in voting for closure.
The presidential veto power
Once legislation has passed both Houses in an identical form, it is sent to
the president for signature. The president can veto the Bill by returning it to
Congress, with a message giving reasons for refusing to sign. If, however, the
Bill is not vetoed within ten days while Congress is in session, it becomes law
without the presidential signature. The president also has a ‘pocket veto’;
if, after Congress has adjourned, the president fails to sign a Bill within ten
days, excluding Sundays, then it lapses. This can be quite a significant power
in practice, because many Bills are passed in a hurry at the end of the session,
and the president can use the pocket veto without having to give his reasons,
and without fear that his veto will be overridden. President Carter used the
pocket veto to nullify four Acts of Congress right at the end of his administra-
tion, even after having been defeated in the presidential election.
The veto power is an important weapon in the presidential armoury, for
the threat of the use of the veto can be used to gain amendments to legisla-
tion. However, it is also a somewhat clumsy weapon; the president can only
accept or reject a measure in toto, for there is no power to veto particular
items in a Bill. Congress sometimes uses this fact to add ‘riders’ to Bills
they know the president will not veto. Clauses unrelated to the main subject
matter of the Bill are included, because Congress knows that the president