Presidential politics 157different. In 1955 President Eisenhower allowed his press conferences to be
filmed for television, and instead of a cosy, off-the-record discussion, the press
conference became an unprecedented opportunity for a president to answer,
before a national audience, the questions put to him by reporters. President
Kennedy took this process one vital stage further. Whereas the Eisenhower
conferences were filmed and edited before transmission, Kennedy instituted
the live press conference, in which he stood before the television cameras
giving his views on a wide range of subjects direct to the American people
without the intervention of time or editors. The impact of this method of
communication is difficult to measure, but its significance for presidential
leadership must surely be enormous. The president is, of course, thoroughly
briefed by his press secretary, by the State Department and by other advis-
ers upon likely questions and the answers to be given. At one time he was
in a position of considerable superiority over his questioners, who treated
him with deference and did not attempt to cross-question him. However, the
effect of the Watergate scandal was to transform the attitudes of the press
and television reporters to the presidency. In 1998 President Clinton was
subjected to the humiliation of being questioned about his relationship with
Monica Lewinsky every time that he gave a press conference at which his in-
tention was to make pronouncements on matters of national or international
importance. Even when the press conferences were held in foreign locations,
such as Moscow or Dublin, the American reporters pursued him mercilessly
and embarrassingly on the subject of his sexual behaviour.
Therefore, as in the case of the president’s role as party leader, the en-
deavour to project an image as a national leader in order to persuade op-
ponents in Congress not to oppose too actively has its limitations. To obtain
public sympathy and understanding for the administration’s position is one
thing, but to translate this into active support, which will make a positive
impact upon Senators and Congressmen, is quite another. Furthermore,
the obverse of the president’s power to persuade through the mass media
is the revelation of weaknesses or the inadequacies of policies or character.
A misjudged attempt to persuade may quickly have the reverse effect from
that which was intended. The intelligent use of the media of communication
must avoid saturating or boring the public with presidential exhortations. A
dramatic appeal by the president might generate considerable public sup-
port, but dramatic appeals six times a week are likely to have a very different
result. Presidential leadership can be exercised in part, therefore, through
the management, almost the manipulation, of public opinion, but the danger
is that it can also make the president into the prisoner of public opinion, for,
if the effort to persuade fails, it is extremely unlikely that success will be
achieved in any other way.
The institutions of the presidency
Up to this point we have treated the presidency as if it consisted simply of the
president alone. The dominant position of this individual should not, however,