Comp. by: LElumalai Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 9781405132879_4_C Date:31/3/09
Time:21:45:56 Filepath://ppdys1108/BlackwellCup/00_Blackwell/00_3B2/Gregory-
9781405132879/appln/3B2/revises/9781405132879_4_C.3d
summarizes as ‘the ideal speech situation’.
This serves as a basis for the critique ofideol-
ogyas distorted communication and false
consensus. Critical theory can thus be shown
to be grounded on normative standards
that are not arbitrary, but that are inherent
in the very structure of language and
communication.
Habermas links these ideas to an evolution-
ary, developmental model of social evolution
as a learning process. As societies evolve, ‘sys-
tem’ (which is to say those areas of social life
coordinated through the steering mechanisms
of money and power) becomes differentiated
and uncoupled from ‘lifeworld’ (the store-
house of background convictions and world
views against which individuals come to a
mutual understanding) (see figure). Capitalist
modernizationcan then be criticized as a
process of one-sided rationalization, involving
the ‘colonizing’ of the lifeworld through
the over-extension of steering mechanisms
of markets, bureaucracy and technological
rationality.
Habermas sees his work as an attempt to
continue theenlightenmenttradition in the
face of the irrational challenges ofpostmod-
ernism(Habermas, 1990 [1985]). However,
his own views have been criticized for present-
ing anethnocentricview of evolution and
rationality, and many have found his founda-
tionalist arguments for an ‘inherent telos of
speech’ oriented towards consensus
unconvincing.
Others have taken up the challenge posed in
his writings in new ways. Thomas McCarthy,
for example, is a leading figure in attempts
to build links between Habermas’ critical
theory and elements of American pragma-
tism. McCarthy’s book-length exchange with
David Hoy over the relative merits of a critical
theory based on the work of Habermas and the
genealogical approach of Foucault brings out
superbly the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the critical theory tradition (Hoy and
McCarthy, 1994). Hoy argues that Foucault
actually provides an alternative way of con-
tinuing the tradition of critical theory by devel-
oping an internal, genealogical critique that
brings to light the historicity of our reason
and self-understanding. In response, McCarthy
continues to defend Habermas’ aim of con-
structing a systematic theory of reason and
context-transcending truth claims as a neces-
sary basis for critique. This aim also serves
to differentiate Habermas’ engagement with
pragmatism from the more extreme construct-
ivist and ethnocentrist views of Richard
Rorty (see Habermas’ exchange with Rorty in
Brandom, 2000).
Two further caveats are necessary. First, it is
obviously the case that this particular tradition
of critical theory does not have a monopoly
on the concept of ‘critical’. Habermas and
Popper famously tussled over the critical
claims ofcritical rationalism, for example,
whilerealismasserts its critical potential on
the basis of a distinction between surface
appearances and underlying, causal mechan-
isms in a stratified view of reality. Similarly,
although the project of a critical human
geographyhas invoked critical theory in the
sense discussed here (see Gregory, 1978a,
1994), it is a much more heterodox tradition.
In part – and the second caveat – this is
because neither Habermas nor his critics have
critical theory Lifeworld and system
Gregory / The Dictionary of Human Geography 9781405132879_4_C Final Proof page 126 31.3.2009 9:45pm
CRITICAL THEORY