The Dictionary of Human Geography

World War, and influenced during his tenure
at the University of Iowa by thelogical posi-
tivist and former Vienna Circle member,
Gustav Bergmann, believed in the unity
of science, and a single, common scientific
methodology resting on law-based explan-
ation. In his contrary view, geography was
not exceptionalist, but a chip off a uniform
scientific block: to explain phenomena within
or beyond geography ‘means always to recog-
nize them as instances of laws’ (Schaefer,
1953, p. 227). Schaefer argued that geography
should pay particular attention to morpho-
logical laws taking the form, ‘If geographical
pattern (morphology) A, then geographical
pattern (morphology) B’ (seemorphology).
In his reply, Hartshorne (1955) pulverized
Schaefer, even though Schaefer had been dead
for two years. While Hartshorne (necessarily)
won that battle, Schaefer won the war,
ashuman geography increasingly rejected
exceptionalism, first during the formalization
ofspatial scienceduring thequantitative
revolutionand later through its embrace of
social theory. Geography was to be ordin-
ary, not exceptional. tb

Suggested reading
Barnes and Farish (2006).

exchange As an activity, exchange has
played a more or less critical role in virtually
all societies. It has allowed them to exceed the
constraints of subsistence, intensify produc-
tion and diversify patterns ofconsumption
(although by no means equitably), form social
alliances and spatial networks of association,
organize and reproduce social hierarchies by
expanding the reservoir of material surpluses,
and generate new layers of socialcommunica-
tion through the symbolic dimensions of
exchange. Exchange is a precursor to com-
merce and therefore to amarketeconomy
involving transactions of goods and services
between buyers and sellers (seecapitalism).
Hence the central claim of Adam Smith’s
influential 1776 treatise,The wealth of nations

• that a growing socialdivision of labourand
  specialized production of goods generates eco-
  nomic prosperity without causing society itself
  to disintegrate – is premised on the possibility
  of ubiquitous exchange; in other words, mar-
  kets. But this is hardly a given. Some things
  (use-values) may never enter the realm of
  exchange, because society considers it profane
  to sell them. Additionally, some exchanges
  may remain individualized and sporadic, and
  not result in a market (newinstitutional

economicshas shown, for example, how pro-

hibitivetransactions costscan hinder indi-

vidualized exchange from expanding into a

market). Contrarily, exchange may not occur

as acommoditytransaction, or it may occur,

as in situations of barter, as a commodity

transaction not mediated by the money-form.

Finally, the good or service purveyed may take

the social form of a gift, with or without

expectation of reciprocity. The writings of the

Hungarian anthropologist Karl Polanyi (1972)

are particularly illuminating in these matters.

Wherever reciprocity is assumed or implied –

commercial, barter or gift – there is the further

issue of value. In one sense, the issue is straight-

forward: it seems reasonable to assume that in a

dyadic transaction where individuals A and B

exchange a good or service, they do so because

A has something B wants and vice versa. In

short, both A and B have something that the

othervalues. At least two complications arise

here. First, there can be no presumption of a

transaction of equivalent value without refer-

ence to a third, transcendent standard or meas-

ure – whether this takes the guise of: (a) a

subjective marginal utility principle (hence A

and B transact if at least one of them is better

off from the transaction in terms of marginal

utility and neither is worse off – the so-called

Paretoprinciple ofneo-classical economics);

or (b) a principle of equilibration of labour time

(A and B transact goods containing equal

amounts of socially necessary labour time –

the historically grounded Marxist scenario of

non-exploitation:seelabour theory of value;

marxian economics).

This already hints at the second complica-

tion; namely, that exchange can occur despite

the absence of equivalence because of the

unequal circumstances of transactors. Take

the case of distress sales of crop in a drought

year by a cash-strapped farmer. Given the

choice between not selling and starving and

selling at a loss, the second option is Pareto-

superior in terms of marginal utility for both

the farmer who sells and the merchant who

buys. But it appears to pervert any notion of

equivalence. Similarly, take two other

examples: the unemployed person who sells

plasma to a for-profit corporation or the run-

awayboywho performssexual favours inreturn

for money. It is possible to argue in either

instance (and economists do) that the transact-

ors are better off in terms of their respective

marginal utilities (in the corporation’s case, its

marginalutilityofprofit)–butonly,itseems,by

compromising on a notion of equivalence that

enjoins some sense of symmetry. In short, the

Gregory / The Dictionary of Human Geography 9781405132879_4_E Final Proof page 227 1.4.2009 3:17pm

EXCHANGE