The Dictionary of Human Geography

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haunt contemporary culture (Torgovnick,

1991), and its tropes continue to be mobilized

inmoderntourismandthequestforthe‘exotic’.

Indeed, Li (2006) contends that it continues to

be a powerful if hidden presence in critical theo-

rizations that ostensibly seek to expose the

ethnocentrismof the West. ‘In order for the

westto reflect,’ he concludes, ‘the savage must

dance’ (Li, 2006, p. 223). dg

Suggested reading

Staszak (2004).

principal components analysis (pca) A stat-

istical procedure for transforming a data mat-

rix so that variables in the new matrix are

uncorrelated. Unlikefactor analysis(with

which it is often confused/treated synonym-

ously), there are as many variables (termed

‘components’) in the transformed as in the

original matrix. Component loadings and

scores are interpreted as are those derived

from factor analyses, and component matrices

can also be rotated. The pca procedure has

been widely used in human geography: (a) to

identify groups of interrelated variables

inductively; (b) to simplify a data set by

removing redundant information; (c) to

reorganize a data set in order to eliminate

collinearity; and (d) to test hypotheses.

(See alsofactorial ecology.) rj

Suggested reading

Johnston (1978).

prisoner’s dilemma An application ofgame

theory that illustrates the benefits of co-

operative behaviour in certain situations and

has been deployed to suggest a rationale for

thestate.

In the game’s classic version (see Rapoport

and Chammah, 1965), two men are arrested

on charges of both car theft and armed rob-

bery. The first offence can be readily proven,

but the other cannot; convictions for the latter

will only be obtained if one of the men con-

fesses and implicates the other. The suspects

know that if they both stay silent they will be

found guilty of theft and serve a short prison

sentence (one year); they also know that if

both are found guilty of the armed robbery

they will serve eight years. They are interro-

gated separately and not allowed to consult,

let alone collude. Each is offered the deal that

if he confesses to the robbery, resulting in the

accomplice being found guilty, he will be freed

and the accomplice will get ten years. The four

options are set out in the following matrix:.

The first figure in each cell indicates Suspect

A’s punishment if that option is chosen by

them both, and the second indicates

Suspect’s B punishment. Thus if neither con-

fesses to the robbery, each serves one year in

prison; if A confesses and B does not, however,

then A will be freed and B will serve ten years.

For each, the best option is to confess, because

if either remains silent and the other confesses,

he will get ten years’ imprisonment. Neither

dare stay silent for fear that the other will not.

If the two could collude, or could guarantee

that the accomplice would stay silent, then the

optimal solution is for both to remain silent – a

one-year sentence. But because neither can

guarantee the other’s choice, each selects a

sub-optimal outcome and gets an eight-year

sentence.

The dilemma has been used as ametaphor

not only to illustrate that selfish behaviour

may not be in an individual’s best interests,

but also that it is not in a person’s interests to

act unselfishly if everybody else takes the self-

ish option, particularly in issues regarding

resource use and resource management

(cf.tragedy of the commons). In most situ-

ations involving more than a small number of

actors, it is argued, unselfish behaviour can

only be guaranteed if enforced by an external

authority, such as the state, which exists to

promote both the collective and the individual

good – although there are many situations

(some illustrated by more complex versions

of the prisoner’s dilemma game – such as the

iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in which the

‘game’ is played many times: see Axelrod,

1984) in which co-operation is sensible and

can promote the collective good without state

involvement. rj

Suggested reading

Barrett (2003); Laver (1997); Poundstone

(1992).

prisons Segregative institutions designed to

punish, typically for criminal offences. Prisons

are usually strictly regulated and tightly sur-

veyed environments, to which offenders are

confined for varying lengths of time, and

sometimes for life. Often referred to as ‘peni-

tentiaries’ or ‘correctional institutions’,

Suspect B

Not confess Confess

Suspect A Not confess 1,1 10,0

Confess 0,10 8,8

Gregory / The Dictionary of Human Geography 9781405132879_4_P Final Proof page 582 1.4.2009 3:20pm

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS (PCA)