The Economist - UK (2022-02-19)

TheEconomistFebruary19th 2022 BriefingTheUkrainecrisis 17

raine—whichmanyfearwouldmakeUk­
raineveryhardtogovernasa unitarystate.
“Weverymuchtrustourpartnerswillput
theappropriateinfluenceontheKyivgov­
ernment,”MrPutintoldMrScholzandthe
assembledjournalists.
Astothemootedwithdrawals,Western
governmentssaytheyseenosignofthem.
Indeed, some Western securitysources,
convincedthatMrPutinunderestimates
theextentofUkrainianresistance,contin­
uetoseea large­scaleinvasionashighly
likely.Andsothesuspensecontinues.

Moredivisionsthanthepope
WithwhatAmericasaysarenow150,
troopsinstrikingdistanceoftheborder
betweenRussiaandUkraineanda further
30,000inBelarus,MrPutinenjoyswhat
thewonks of warcall escalationdomi­
nance:hecanattack,hecanpullbackor,
fora whileatleast,hecanstayput,com­
mandingtheworld’sattention. President
JoeBiden,whocalledhima killer,hasbeen
onthephoneseveraltimes.Europeanlead­
erswhopreviouslyrefusedtodiscussse­
curitywithhim,have,inthewordsofMs
Simonyan, “formed a queue to admire
MoscowinFebruary”.Russia’scomplaints
aboutnatomissilesstationedinPoland
andelsewherearegettinga hearing.
Butwhilehisperchinthecatbirdseat
increasestheunpredictabilityintheshort
term,it hasalsocreateda newandirrevers­
iblefactabouttheworld:MrPutin’sRussia
hasbecomethesortofcountrythatmight
launcha large­scalewarofaggression.
Asmany inUkraine,notto mention
Chechnya,GeorgiaandSyria,willbearwit­
ness,MrPutinisbynomeansa pacifist.
Butformostofhistimeinofficetheideaof
Russiaengagingina majorwarwitha for­
eignpower hasbeenoneitspublicand
elitescouldsafelyignore.In 2014 thean­
nexationofCrimeawasbloodlessandthe
fomentingofconflictinDonbasunderta­

ken bydeniable“little greenmen”.This

year,though,hehaslookedsettowagean

all­outwar.And whateverhappensover

thenextfewdaysorweeks,thatreadiness

willbea newreality;aslongasMrPutinre­

mainsinpower,thepossibilityofawar

launchedtofurtherthatpowerwillbea

conditionofhisrule.Thatwillingnessis

notjusta frighteningnewrealityforUk­

raineand,indeed,nato. Italsoterrifies

manyinRussia’selite.

InthelastdecadesoftheSovietUnion,

conventionalwarwiththeWestwasseen

asunlikely;theleaderswhofollowedSta­

linrememberedwhatthepreviouswarhad

beenlike.Inthepost­Sovieterathewhole

ideastoppedmakinganysense.Russians

craveda Westernlifestyleandbelievedthat

theonlythingthathadbeenstandingbe­

tween them and Western supermarkets

hadbeentheCommunistParty.Democrat­

icreformswerecarriedoutinthenameof

the market economy and convergence

withtheWest.When MrPutincameto

powerin2000,hewasseenbyRussians

withmoneyasa guarantorofconsumer­

ismandforeigntravel.Heenjoyedthesup­

portoftheburgeoningmiddleclassand

theWestalike.

Fromthelate2000son,confrontation

withtheWest,focusedparticularlyonits

deepeningrelationshipswithRussia’sfor­

merlySovietneighbours,becamecentral

toMrPutin’sworldviewandtheideology

ofhisregime.InFebruary2007,attheMu­

nichsecurityconference,hemadea com­

bativespeechchallengingAmerica'sdomi­

nanceandassertingRussia’sresurgence.

Thefollowingyear,hisarmymovedinto

Georgia, ostensibly to defend two en­

claves,AbkhaziaandSouthOssetia,which

hadaskedforRussianprotection;theun­

derlyingreasonwastowarnthecountry

offitsmovestowardsjoiningnato.

Butthisantagonismhasnot,for the

mostpart,beena practicalproblemforthe

Russianpeople. Thosewellenoughoffto

afforditcontinuedtoenjoythefruitsof

post­Soviet openness. They travelled

abroadtosuchanextentthat,beforethe

pandemic,theyhad become theworld’s

sixth­largest spenders on international

tourism.Theyimportedluxuries,enjoyed

a newlycosmopolitanMoscowandbought

second homes in Europe ranging from

bungalowsinBulgariatopalacesonthe

Coted’Azur.Themiddleclassgrewaccus­

tomedtoanopeninternet,comfortablein­

frastructureandride­sharingapps.

Theprospectofa bloodywar—perhaps

evenanoccupation—andsubsequentpari­

ah­domputsallthisindoubt.Inrecent

conversations with The Economist busi­

nesspeople, diplomats, economists and

governmentofficialsinMoscowrevealed

thattheycouldbarelyfathomtheruinous

consequencesawarwouldbringtoRus­

sia—consequenceswhichwouldgofarbe­

yondspecificsanctions.Importsofhigh­

techdesideratawoulddisappear(seeBusi­

nesssection),firmswouldlosetheirvalue,

accesstomuchoftherestoftheworld

wouldbecomefraught,anyveneerofre­

spectabilitywouldbestrippedaway.

Pushcomestoshove

ThisRussianelitehaslongbelievedthat

such direconsequences made awar of

choiceunthinkablefora calculatingman

likeMrPutin.Theycontinuetotreatanin­

vasionasvastlymoreunlikelythanWest­

erngovernmentsseemtothinkit.Butbe­

ingforcedtoconcedethatit hasedgedinto

therealmofthethinkablehasleftthem

deeplyunnerved.

Thosespeakingagainstthewarinthis

waywillrarelyagreetodosopublicly,and

theywillcertainlynotbeconsultedonthe

matterbyMrPutin.Buttheirvoicesmatter.

Someare professionals and technocrats

whohavekepttheeconomyonaneven

keeldespiterampantcorruptionandrent­

Kyiv

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

Crimea

Luhansk

oblast

Donetsk

oblast

Donetsk

Mariupol

Luhansk

Ukrainianterritory

annexedbyRussia

Controlledby

Russian-backed

separatists

LITHUANIA

HUNGARYHU

SLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA

ROMANIA

GEORGIA

CZECHREP.

ITALY

UKRAINE

RUSSIA

POLAND

BELARUSR

Moscow

Berlin Minsk

Rechitsa

Naroulia

Ye l n y a

Pogonovo

Kyiv

Pripyatriver

bridge

BlackSea

GERMANY

Donbas

Crimea

Abkhazia

South

Ossetia

BalticSea

MOLDOVA

EstimatedRussiantroopsbybase,Feb14th 2022

1,

Troopestimateuncertain

Source:RochanConsulting

8,

4,

200 km 100 km