34 Europe The Economist February 19th 2022
A superherosproutsin Brussels
M
ost goodsuperhero movies have a scene in which the pro
tagonist discovers—often after some freakish accident—that
he or she has developed amazing new powers. The first attempts
to use these new powers are unsatisfactory. Shirts are accidentally
torn to shreds and bedrooms covered in spiderweb. Given time,
however, the new abilities are tamed, then mastered. Audiences
soon forget how the unlikely powers were acquired and enjoy the
crusade, caped or otherwise, for justice and order.
Politicians who dream of being superheroes imagine being
able to bend foes to their will. How easy life would be if trouble
makers quietly fell into line. Look at Europe today, and a super
power may be sprouting. For years Poland has been needling the
European Commission, which enforces the treaties binding the 27
member states of the eutogether. Since coming to power in 2015
populists in Warsaw have neutered the judiciary and placed judg
es firmly under the thumb of the government. For a time the com
mission wimpishly spluttered about the vital role of the rule of
law in Europe, even as its threats and ultimatums were gleefully
defied. No longer. Twice this month the Polish authorities have of
fered to climb down, agreeing to reverse their judicial measures in
much the manner the euhas demanded.
For a hint as to why Poland is suing for peace, look to high poli
tics and lowbrow entertainment. The high politics is the sabrerat
tling in Ukraine, Poland’s neighbour. Periods of geopolitical ten
sion are no time to alienate allies; Ukraine is a refugee crisis in the
making for Poland. Perhaps mindful of Russian troops posted in
nextdoor Belarus, President Andrzej Duda earlier this month sug
gested Poland “should close all disputes that exist as soon as pos
sible”. A longrunning spat involving a Polish lignite mine spew
ing smog into the Czech Republic has been hastily settled. A me
diaownership law America didn’t like was also shelved.
The lowbrow bit is the story of the eu’s budding superpowers.
For years the commission has faced a gap in its authority. Coun
tries that wanted to join the club could be made to commit to liber
al democratic standards, such as free speech and independent
courts. This gave the eulots of leverage: follow the rules or you
stay on the outside. But once the aspirants were allowed in, as Po
land was in 2004 alongside several former communistblocneighbours, the muscles in Brussels atrophied. There is a proce
dure to punish member states that flout the norms they had once
signed up to, but it requires nearunanimity to impose. The big
gest sanctions are a loss of voting rights in a bloc that prides itself
on reaching consensus. That is less fearsome than, say, being able
to strike down your enemies with lightning.
As with many superheroes, it was a freakish accident of nature
that gave the euits new powers. The turning point in its case was
the pandemic. One of the bloc’s responses to covid19 was the Next
Generation fund (ngeu), a €750bn ($853bn) pot of grants and loans
earmarked mainly for poorer countries. Poland has long been a re
cipient of vast eulargesse, as anyone who has driven on its fine
new highways can attest. But withholding funds that member
states can tap as part of the normal union budget is complicated.
When it comes to ngeu, the commission has essentially full dis
cretion as to whether Poland is a worthy recipient. So far, it has
pointedly refused to dole out any cash, even as other countries are
seeing their exchequers replenished with ngeu money. That is
€36bn in loans and grants that Poland could tap if Brussels says so,
enough to boost Polish gdpby around 2% in the coming years.
To make matters worse for Poland and the eu’s other miscre
ants, on February 16th the eu’s top court endorsed rules that allow
the commission to withhold even oldfashioned European funds,
such as those paid to boost poor regions, from members it thinks
are flouting their ruleoflaw obligations. That comes on top of the
existing ability to levy fines on those breaking eurules; in one
such case against Poland penalties are now running at €1m a day.Pole-axed
Like Peter Parker fumbling with his new webweaving abilities,
the Eurocracy needs time to adjust to these new powers. For it is
not just ruleoflaw violations that could be addressed. In the past
Brussels railed against member states not abiding by eurozone
debt and deficit rules. The weighty rulings it produced had all the
impact of a report issued by a thinktank: praised as obviously
sensible, then swiftly forgotten. Now Eurocrats can ensure their
recommendations are listened to, lest dollops of ngeumoney be
withheld. Pow!
There are limits to these newfound powers. Poland has made
good use of European funds, so their withdrawal would be felt by
voters and make the government less popular. It is therefore keen
to mollify Brussels. By contrast Hungary has squandered eucash
on projects that benefit cronies of the prime minister, Viktor Or
ban. A squeeze would hurt them, but affect Hungarian voters rath
er less. So Mr Orban has more leeway to ignore Brussels’s nagging
about his serial rulebreaking. His government denounced this
week’s ruling as “politically motivated”.
A more humdrum constraint is whether the euwants to use
these powers at all. Eurocrats wielding such awesome authority
willynilly might raise questions about accountability; big mem
ber states such as Germany have long pushed for a soft approach
on rulebreakers. Poland has power too, or thinks it does. It has
threatened to derail the bloc’s agenda. But that is mostly a hollow
threatgiven that so much eubusiness is vetoproof these days.
The contours of the eu’s victory against Polish judgenobbling
remain unclear. The populist government may struggle to muster
a fractious parliament to endorse its climbdown. Critics deem the
measures insufficient; the commission seems confidentitcan
push for even more concessions. Poland may stay defiant.Butthe
Eurocrats in Brussels look a lot more powerful than they did.nCharlemagne
A Polish climbdown signals a new era of eupower—if it chooses to use it