CHAPTER 14
Animal Memory and Cognition
E. J. CAPALDI
399WHAT IS ANIMAL COGNITION? 402
COGNITIVE PROCESSES 403
Perception 403
Discrimination Learning and Categorization 403
Serial Learning 405
Numerical Abilities 407
Theory of Mind 407
Interval Timing 409
Memory 410
Spatial Learning 411
Language Learning in Animals 414
Evolution and Cognition 416
Evolution and Cognition: Implications 417
REFERENCES 419Animal cognition is of concern not only to psychologists but to
numerous other scientists in diverse fields. It may be said that
there has been an explosion of interest in animal cognition in
recent years. Two of the major but independent factors respon-
sible for this increase in interest are a dissatisfaction with
“simpler” associative approaches to animal behavior and the
application of evolutionary thinking to an increasing number
of problem areas. Rejecting associationism is not new (see,
e.g., Lashley, 1951). Nor is applying evolution to cognition
new, Darwin (1871) himself being a devotee of that approach.
Increasingly, however, biologists and psychologists, among
others, are turning to the study of animal behavior, if not ani-
mal cognition, within the context of evolution.
Behaviorism was an early dominant movement in
American psychology. It suggested that the subject matter of
psychology was behavior, and that behavior was best investi-
gated employing animals, particularly in learning situations.
Moreover, behavior was to be explained by eschewing men-
tal states as explanatory devices while emphasizing learned
associations, particularly associations between stimuli and
responses. Two prominent exceptions to these more or less
orthodox behavioristic views were those of Edward Chase
Tolman (1932) and B. F. Skinner (1938). Tolman (1948) saw
himself as a cognitive or purposive behaviorist and con-
sidered forms of explanations in addition to associations—
for example, cognitive representations such as maps of spa-
tial relations in the environment. For Skinner (a radical
behaviorist), on the other hand, even associations were too
mentalistic: Skinner rejected all forms of mentalistic expla-
nation. Clark Hull’s (1943) form of behaviorism, developed
from the 1930s to the 1950s, was quite popular. In Hull’s sys-
tem, internal processes mediated between external stimuli
and overt responses, but mediational events were not mental
states. Rather, they were internal stimuli (e.g., stimuli arising
from response feedback) and fractional forms of overt re-
sponses (e.g., small chewing movements).
Two basic learning processes were favored by the early
behaviorists; these processes remain popular today. In one,
Pavlovian conditioning,stimuli are presented without regard
to the animal’s behavior. For example, a tone might be pre-
sented for a brief period, followed by food. Learning would
be indexed by salivation, initially elicited by food, but later
occurring to the tone. Interestingly, many Pavlovian phenom-
ena obtained in birds and rats appear to take a similar form in
humans (e.g., Wasserman & Berglan, 1998). In the other pop-
ular procedure, instrumental conditioning,reinforcement is
contingent on responding in the presence of some stimulus.
For example, a tone might signal a hungry rat to receive food
by pressing a bar. Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning
are treated at length by Miller and Grace; see their chapter in
this volume.
In the 1970s there arose within animal psychology a
renewed concern with animal cognition (see, e.g., Hulse,
Fowler, & Honig, 1978). This movement had several char-
acteristics worth mentioning. It was concerned with prob-
lems not emphasized, or even recognized, within the broad