The USA, for all its fears and though it has restricted immigration, continues
to be much more generous to peoples it sees as oppressed, and large numbers of
Asians and Hispanics have been allowed to settle, and have become vital
members of US society, in the last 20 years. Western Europe, on the other
hand, has meanwhile placed severe constraints on immigration. In the 1990s
the problem was re-emerging in a novel guise, with significant demands for
immigration from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union of people
seeking the riches and opportunities of developed capitalist societies. So
seriously is this taken as a threat that discussions have even been held as to
the possibility of usingNATO-dedicated troops for the purpose of policing
immigration. One problem emerging at the end of the 20th century was to
distinguish would-be immigrants, especially those referred to as ‘economic
immigrants’, from asylum seekers fleeing persecution. Because most Western
nations have obligations underinternational lawto accept asylum seekers,
some individuals wishing to evade their increasingly strict immigration con-
trols seek to pass themselves off as refugees from persecution. The relative
numbers of these ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and the process for
dealing with their applications to remain in the country have developed into
major political issues in a number of Western European countries.
Immobilisme
Immobilismeis a French term, especially applied to the politics of theThird
Republic(1870–1940) and theFourth Republic(1946–58). Under these
systems France had no strong central executive government. Instead all power
was vested in the National Assembly, from and by which governments and
prime ministers were elected. Because of the multiple divisions in French
society, and the complex multi-party system that emerged from theseclea-
vages(greatly encouraged in the Fourth Republic by aproportional repre-
sentationvoting system), cabinets were extremely unstable coalitions. At
times the life of governments was measured only in days, and few lasted more
than a year. In consequence, especially as fellow members of the same
coalitions were often in deep disagreement about policies, no coherent and
lasting set of governmental priorities and policies could be developed. The
consequence was that very little was ever achieved as a result of government
initiative. Hence the system came to be seen as ‘immobile’, as incapable of
doing anything to adapt France to changing socio-economic trends. In fact, in
many ways the Fourth Republic did adapt quickly, with rapid economic
growth rates and increasing affluence. This, however, was almost entirely
due to the efficiency and power of the administrative civil service, who came
to be undisputed masters of the departments of state, no political minister
remaining long enough to take control. Certainly almost nothing of value
Immobilisme