102 Islam and Modernity
culminated in a schism between ‘conservative’ and more ‘fundamentalist’ cur-
rents of thought among the ulama and their followers. Infl uenced by increased
contacts with the Muslim world, some took a more purist stance vis-à-vis local
customs (which were denounced as un-Islamic) and were insistent on establish-
ing a way of life based on a strict interpretation of the sharia. However, whatever
their doctrinal divergences, when it came to the question of women’s place in
society and the family, conservatives and fundamentalists concurred on equally
negative views about gender equality (Babadjanov 2004).
Above and beyond the pronouncements of religious authorities and their
more radical opponents, a more diffuse but persistent circulation of conservative
gender ideologies started emanating from post-independence states. The secular
rulers of successor regimes were themselves eager to display their allegiance to
the faith. Islam was celebrated as part of a glorious national heritage and leaders
demonstrated their personal piety by performing the hajj or taking oaths on the
Quran (Olcott 1995). The rapid building of mosques and madrasas served as
a sign of national rebirth. In Uzbekistan, by the time Islamic militancy had
become associated with threats from extremist groups aiming to destabilise the
regime, the government was at pains to distinguish between the local (national
and therefore benign) and the foreign (transnational and therefore perilous)
expressions of Islam. A new focus on Islamic observance as a possible signifi er of
political extremism brought the issue of women’s veiling, which is now banned,
to the forefront again. The government of Uzbekistan responded by attempting
to police the boundaries between acceptable national dress (the colourful head-
scarf leaving the face bare) and ‘transnational’ veiling (or what is considered as
‘Arab’ or foreign dress) signifying an expression of extremism or ‘Wahhabism’,
a loosely utilised but politically charged expression in common use in the region
(Abramson 2004).
The bid to contain religious practice by making it conform to an emergent
‘offi cial’ national ideology, which is itself patriarchal in form and content, renders
the boundaries between so-called secular and Islamic moralities and expecta-
tions blurred and indistinct. After the break-up of the Union, the successor elites
of Central Asian states had independence thrust upon them in the absence of
signifi cant anti-Soviet mobilisation. These elites, nonetheless, embarked upon
a search for ideologies of national independence that centred around a denun-
ciation of their colonial legacies. The privileged locus of ‘de-sovietisation’ was
sought in the realm of culture and loss of culture (through Russifi cation) was
singled out as one of the principal injuries of Soviet rule. Calls for the return of
women to roles more in keeping with their ‘natural destiny’ started circulating
in the local secular press, apparently eliciting little overt reaction. The distribu-
tion of welfare benefi ts by mahalla (neighbourhood) committees, which replaced
universal welfare provision with targeted assistance for the poor, appeared to
discriminate against divorcees and single mothers, pointing to the increasingly