1 Advances in Political Economy - Department of Political Science

EDITOR’S PROOF

112 E. Schnidman and N. Schofield

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Fig. 5 Optimal Republican position

This is determined by the set of voter preferred points{xi}. The coefficients{ij}

for candidatejwill depend on the position of the other candidate,k.Thebalance

equationfor eachjis then given by:

[

zelj−z∗j

]

+

1

2 β

[

dμj

dzj

∣

∣

∣

z

]

= 0.

Here we call[zelj−z∗j]theelectoral gradient for party j, since in the absence of

activist resources, the equilibrium condition would be given by the condition

[

zelj −z∗j

]

= 0.

The second term in this expression is called theactivist gradient for party j.We

suggest that this first order condition will guarantee that the vectorz∗=(z∗dem,z∗rep)

will then be apure strategy Nash equilibrium of the vote maximizing political con-

test.

In the model for the 2008 election given in Table5, we used a simulation proce-

dure and found that the equilibrium for the model (4) in Table5 was given by the

vector