EDITOR’S PROOF
A Non-existence Theorem for Clientelism in Spatial Models 201921
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966In turn it is straightforward to see that, for values ofGP<1, the functionGP+(^1 δ−+G (^1) /P 2 )can only be greater than ‘1’ ifδ>^1 / 2 (algebra omitted).
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