1 Advances in Political Economy - Department of Political Science

EDITOR’S PROOF

226 G. Serra

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this paper the parallel decision of partyLwho might also be pondering whether

to choose a primary election. Such analysis is being done in a separate paper, and

here I simply assume that partyLhas already chosen a candidate by any method. In

other words,πLis taken as an exogenous parameter. In any case, remember that the

actual campaigning skills ofLandR’s candidates are revealed when they start cam-

paigning to win the election. ThusvLandvRare fully known when voters decide

whotovotefor.

4.1 Party Members Versus Party Leaders

PartyRconsists of an “elite” (or “leadership”) and a “membership” (or “rank and

file”). The elite ofRwill be referred to asRE. This leadership is policy-motivated

and has an ideal policy pointXRE, withXRE>0. The utility function ofR’s

elite is

URE(x)=−|XRE−x|

The rank and file (RAF) ofRis also policy-motivated. To simplify the analysis,

I will assume that the RAF has a median member whose preferences are decisive in

the primary election. I callRMthe median member ofRand I callXRMher ideal

point, withXRM>0. The utility function ofRMis

URM(x)=−|XRM−x|

In general, we will haveXRE=XRM, so there will be a tension between the

policy preferences of a party’s leadership and its RAF. It will be useful to mea-

sure the divergence, if any, between a party’s establishment and its primary voters.

With that purpose, I definedRas theinternal divergencein partyR, wheredR≡

|XRM−XRE|. An interesting interpretation ofdR is as thecongruence(or lack

thereof) betweenR’s elite and mass membership. Higher levels of the internal di-

vergencedRindicate a lower elite-mass congruence inside the party. Note thatdR

can take any non-negative value:dR≥0.

Parties are also responsible for formulating policy platforms to compete in the

election. More precisely, parties are in charge of indicating the policy platforms

they wish their candidates to follow in each circumstance. If partyRuses a lead-

ership selection, then its leaders formulate the policy strategies to be followed by

its candidate. If, instead, partyRuses a primary election, then its candidate will

follow the policy strategies desired by the RAF. Note that both the leadership and

the RAF think strategically. This implies that they would not passively impose their

ideal points on the candidate, but rather, they will design a strategy that maximizes

their expected utility taking into account the behavior of the rival party in the general

election.