206 Michael Bradie
Mechanisms”) andEMT(for “Evolution of Moral Theses”). Acronyms are use-
ful until they get in the way of understanding. Since there is a parallel between
evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics and our present focus is on the
emergence ofnormativity, it may be appropriate to introduce a new and simpler
set of acronyms to cover both cases. On the one hand, there is the question of
the evolution of the neural structures that enable us to form beliefs, generate
knowledge, adopt norms and apply them. Call these programs or projects “EM”
(evolution of mechanisms) projects whether they are concerned with the evolu-
tion ofepistemicmechanisms ormoralmechanisms. On the other hand, there is
the question of the evolution of the norms themselves. The scientific method and
the norms that guide it did not spring full blown from the head of Zeus. It has
evolved over the centuries. Similarly there is a vast difference between the code
of Hammurabi, the Golden Rule and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
So there has been an evolution in our understanding of counts as moral norms as
well. Concerns with the evolution of normsper seare part of “EN” (evolution of
norms) programs or projects.
TheEMprogram in epistemology is concerned with the use of evolutionary
theory to explain the characteristics of the cognitive capacities of animals and
humans. At some point in the distant past the Earth was populated by lineages
consisting of organisms too primitive to be said to possess knowledge or have the
capacity to reason. These lineages evolved over time into lineages that did consist
of organisms with the capacity for reasoning and knowing. These capacities are
phenotypic traits of the organisms that possess them and, given the general truth
of the Darwinian picture, evolved under the impetus of natural selection and other
evolutionary mechanisms. The details may be difficult to discover since brains and
thoughts do not fossilize easily but anyone sympathetic to Darwinism will have
little difficulty in accepting that this account of the evolution of the cognitive
capacities of organisms is roughly correct.
TheENprogram in epistemology, on the other hand, is the attempt to account
for the evolution of ideas, scientific theories and epistemic norms by using models
and metaphors drawn from evolutionary theory. There are, no doubt, compelling
analogies between the processes involved in biological evolution and the processes
involved in the evolution of human knowledge. Karl Popper’s “conjectures and
refutations” model for the growth of scientific knowledge was consciously shaped by
Popper’s understanding of evolutionary theory [Hull, 1999]. Nevertheless, there are
compelling disanalogies as well [Bradie, 1986]. The bottom line is that the case for
epistemologicalENprograms is nowhere near as strong as that for epistemological
EMprograms. In fact, a little reflection shows that the fate of the two programs
is independent of one another. There is every reason to suspect that someEM
story will turn out to be correct. If it didn’t, then this would necessitate a serious
rethinking of Darwinian evolutionary theory. The same is not true for theEN
programs. We don’t as yet have a clear understanding of the development of
human knowledge or the establishment of epistemic norms but it seems clear that
no straightforward evolutionary story is going to provide it.