Evolution and Normativity 215First, are we to follow Wittgenstein and eschew all empirical input for the res-
olution of philosophical problems or are we to follow Dewey in thinking that the
advent of Darwinism radically reshapes the philosophical landscape and forces us
to rethink some of the timeworn and traditional problems that philosophers have
posed for themselves? I have suggested that Dewey’s path is the one we ought
to follow but I freely admit that there is no knock down drag out argument that
will convince the diehard traditionalist. Second, we must take a stance on the
relationship between the traditional accounts and the evolutionary accounts. I
have advocated a hybrid view that recognizes the importance of normative de-
mands but sees evolutionary theory as forcing a reconceptualization of the nature
of those demands.
That said there are a number of open questions still left to be pursued.
What are the biological bases of normative activity? What are the neural
processes that enable us to be the normative creatures that we are? How have we
come to accept the norms that we do? This is a historical and cultural history
project more than anything else.
Beginning in the latter part of the nineteenth century and continuing to the
present day, there have been numerous attempts to apply Darwinian ideas to the
evolution of morality. Needless to say many of these attempts were as much a
product of the author’s views about how things should have turned out as they
were accurate accounts of how norms were adopted and discarded over the cen-
turies. I am far from supposing that a completely unbiased historical account
of the development of norms is possible. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a
continuing concern that needs to be periodically addressed is our understanding
both of normativity and of the historical contingencies that shape the evolution
of norms changes. As a first but daunting step, it would be very interesting and
constructive if someone or some group were to undertake the task of constructing
a meta-analysis of the analyses that have already been written. There is more
than enough work to keep future generations of scholars busy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY[Alexander, 1987]R. Alexander.The Biology of Moral Systems. Aldine De Gruyter: New York,
1987.
[Bagehot, 1956]W. Bagehot.Physics and Politics; or, Thoughts on the Application of the Prin-
ciples of “Natural Selection” and “Inheritance” to Political Society. Boston: Beacon Press,
1956.
[Bradie, 1986]M. Bradie. Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology.Biology & Philosophy4: 401-
59, 1986.
[Bradie, 2001]M. Bradie. The Metaphysical Foundation of Campbell’s Selectionist Epistemol-
ogy. InSelection Theory and Social Construction: The Evolutionary Naturalistic Epistemol-
ogy of Donald T. Campbell, edited by David Hull and Celia Heyes. Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2001.
[Bradie, 1990]M. Bradie. Should Epistemologists Take Darwin Seriously? InEvolution, Cog-
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