Philosophy of Biology

Evolutionary Ethics 241

social movements as “political correctness” seems strangely misguided. Pinker
argues that the denial of what he calls “human nature” has promoted cruel and
unnatural childrearing regimes, parental guilt over children who turn out badly,
urban planning that violates the human desire for natural light, ornament, and
surroundings to scale, and the release of psychopaths under the illusion that they
can be reformed by counseling [Pinker, 2002, xi]. It has also, one might add,
promoted toleration of psychopaths under the illusion that they are great men,
racial oppression under the illusion that marked differences in facial features and
skin colour must signal marked differences in cognitive ability, the persecution of
homosexuals, and cruel marital regimes.
To clarify the relationship between social inequalities that arise out of real, and
therefore natural differences in human beings within certain social frameworks and
the demands posited by philosophical morality, the Evolutionary Ethicist might
be presented with the following Basic Factual Claim:

Basic Factual Claim: There is a correlation, positive in some cases,

negative in others, between being a member of a particular racial or

national group, or of one sex rather than the other, and experiencing a

better or worse life. Sex, race, and nationality have a predictive value

with respect to well-being, not only with respect to income, prestige,

executive authority, and so on.

An Evolutionary Ethicist would be ill-advised to reject the Basic Factual Claim,
since there is abundant evidence that sex, ethnicity, and parentage influence one’s
likelihood of experiencing poverty, abandonment, domestic violence, isolation, poor
health over the long term, and so on. Moreover, accepting it does not commit
anyone to the normative claim that so-called statistical equality is a desideratum.
The Evolutionary Ethicist must now decide whether to accept the following Basic
Normative Principle.

Basic Normative Principle: There should be no correlation, positive

or negative, between being a member of a particular racial or national

group, or of one sex rather than the other, and enjoying or suffering

a better or worse outcome. Sex, race, and nationalityought to have

no predictive value with respect to well-being — liberty, security, and

enjoyment of life — whether or not they have a predictive value with

respect to income, prestige, executive authority, and so on.

Note that an Evolutionary Ethicist who accepts this principle is still not com-
mitted to the claim that statistical equality is morally desirable or obligatory. For
there may be no correlation between objective well-being and the possession of
income, prestige, authority, and so on.
If the traditional moralist would be well served by acknowledging the validity of
the Is-to-Ought-Principle, the evolutionary ethicist would be equally well served
by acknowledging the validity of the Basic Normative Principle. It is difficult