24 Michael Ruse
than a comment, although it has certainly been enough for some contemporary
philosophers to claim Darwin for their own.
There is a detailed discussion of morality in theDescent. Darwin is concerned
first to get moral norms, and then to see why they have their force, something he
puts down to conscience. The precise nature of the moral norms is not of great
interest to Darwin — basically he wants something along the lines of common
sense, a sort of mishmash of utilitarianism, Kantianism and subscription to the
Golden rule or the love commandment. The main thing is that we do have such a
sense of obligation.
I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers who maintain that of
all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense
or conscience is by far the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh
remarks, “has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of human
action;” it is summed up in that short but imperious wordought,so
full of high significance. It is the most noble of all the attributes of
man, leading him without a moment’s hesitation to risk his life for that
of a fellow creature; or after due deliberation, impelled simply by the
deep feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause. [Then
follows the above-given quotation from Kant.] (1, 70)But how does morality get enforced? Conscience kicks in. “The following propo-
sition seems to me in a high degree probable –namely, that any animal whatever,
endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense
or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or
nearly as well developed, as in man” (1, 71–72). In more detail:
At the moment of action, man will no doubt be apt to follow the
stronger impulse; and though this may occasionally prompt him to the
noblest deeds, it will more commonly lead him to gratify his own desires
at the expense of other men. But after their gratification, when past
and weaker impressions are contrasted with the ever-enduring social
instincts, retribution will surely come. Man will feel dissatisfied with
himself and will resolve with more or less force to act differently for the
future. This is conscience; for conscience looks backwards and judges
past actions, inducing that kind of dissatisfaction, which if weak we
call regret, and if severe remorse. (1, 91)There is an interesting subtext here, one that connects directly with a topic much
discussed today [Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999]. Charles Darwin was always inter-
ested in the level at which natural selection operates [Ruse, 1980]. We have seen
that he had no proper knowledge of (what we call) genetics, so he could not take
what Richard Dawkins [1976] has called the “selfish gene” approach, but he could
and did take (what we call) a hard-line “individual selection” approach. That is
to say, he thought that natural selection pits individual against individual, rather
than group against group. Any group contests resolve themselves ultimately as