Biological Conceptions of Race 477race concept. The main problem, here, is that skin color (and often other overt
features as well) is (are) often an inextricable part of common sense conceptions
of race. Yet, according to Glasgow, the cladistic concept treats overt morphology
as irrelevant to race because it defines races in terms of genealogy alone. After
considering and rejecting the possibility of semantic deference to science over the
meaning of ‘race’, Glasgow concludes that cladistic races are not really ‘races’.
Andreasen [2005] responds to Glasgow in part by arguing that he tells a selective
story about the meaning of ‘race’. She adds that once we examine a fuller picture,
we see more overlap — both intensional and extensional — between the cladistic
concept and common sense than Glasgow allows. She adds that because Glasgow
allows that minor revisions in meaning are allowable, this is sufficient to show
that the cladistic race concept is legitimately a theory about ‘race’. Nonetheless,
because she acknowledges that some divergence between the cladistic concept and
common sense is possible, she argue that some cross-classification is not a problem
for the cladistic view. Part of the reason is that differing folk conceptions of race
sometimes cross-classify on another as well.^34
Ultimately, the disagreement between Glasgow and Andreasen is over how to
settle the meaning of purported natural kind terms when scientists and everyday
folk disagree. With respect to ‘race’, Glasgow defends the authority of common
sense and argues that scientists are not the arbiters of the meaning of ‘race’.
Andreasen [2000; 2004; 2005] argues, on the other hand, that one need not reject
the cladistic concept because it deviates somewhat form common sense. She uses
the causal theory of reference as well as examples from the history of science to
support her point. Yet she also raises the possibility that there might be two
somewhat divergent meanings of ‘race’ — one folk, the other scientific — that
coexist in relative harmony.
6 CONCLUSIONWhen addressing questions about the biological reality, or lack thereof, of race, it is
often assumed that scientists have shown, conclusively, that races are biologically
unreal. I hope to have shown, however, that the answer to this question is not
as straightforward as many make it seem. Not only are many of the arguments
against the biological reality of human race problematic, there are a number of
newer biological conceptions that are not addressed by the standard arguments
against the biological reality of race. Of these, phylogenetic conceptions appear to
be the most promising.
(^34) See Atran [1990] and Dupr ́e [1993] for a similar point about other types of biological cate-
gories.