such integration, work will change from a burden to a source of
joy, and the worker’s life will become ‘a triumphal procession.’
Proceeding from work to ‘ideas,’ Proudhon repeats the attack
on the Absolute already introduced in The Philosophy of Progress.
What he says here is not markedly new, though it is expressed
with a greater variety of illustration and argument. He does not
deny the Absolute, but contends that it cannot be known, and
seeks to eliminate it from our philosophical arguments and to
concentrate our attention on phenomenal aspects of the universe,
which alone fall within the province o f exact knowledge.
Once we have expelled the Absolute from our minds, once we
have ceased to refer all ideas to a set and monolithic conception,
we shall gain that freedom o f thinking which admits the oppo
sition or mutual reaction o f ideas and faculties, out o f which
arise not only the life and dynamism o f society, but also its
equilibrium and, by implication, its peace. Thus, paradoxically,
we can only maintain agreement and harmony within society, and
at the same time avoid absolutism o f every kind, by sustaining
social energies in a state o f perpetual struggle.
Priests and philosophers seek a uniform faith; the Revolution
thrives on multiplicity and variety. ‘Public reason’ in a free society
would be built on the spontaneous interaction o f individual ways
of thinking. These would continue their independent existences
while taking on extended life within the collective thought, which
is made up o f them and yet has its own character, different in
quality and superior in power. The organ o f collective reason is
never formalised or institutionalised; it is to be found in any
group o f men who gather for the discussion o f ideas or the search
for Justice.
*Theologians talk in terms of a human conscience, but their
absolutism prevents them from recognising its defining character
istic, the faculty o f deciding freely between good and evil. Yet
the intimate feelings of men and the collective facts of social life
prove that such a faculty exists.
The criterion o f good that emerges from the action o f the
human conscience can be summarised in the double maxim,
known to wise men in all ages: ‘Do not unto others what you
would not have them do unto you. D o constantly unto others
2X1
THE PALADIN OF JUSTICE