Science, Religion, and the Human Experience

the intersubjective worlds of science and religion 319

ulty that sees them, and perceived sounds exist relative to the auditory faculty

that hears them. There is no reason to believe that such perceptual phenomena

exist in the objective world, independent of all sense perception. Nevertheless,

in our intersubjective world of experience, multiple subjects may apprehend

colors and sounds in similar ways, which allows for true statements to be made

about them that are independent of any specific subject. Another truth that is

invariable across all cognitive frames of reference is that conceptual objects

exist in relation to the conceptual faculties and frameworks by which they are

apprehended. However, when these concepts are reified, we may be led to

believe that they exist in the objective world, independent of any thinking mind

or conceptual framework. This theory does not reduce all concepts to mere

artifacts of specific individuals or societies. As Hilary Putnam comments, “the

stars are indeed independent of our minds in the sense of being causally in-

dependent; we did not make the stars....Thefact that there is no one meta-

physically privileged description of the universe does not mean that the uni-

verse depends on our minds.”^22

The Pursuit of the Universal Truths

Scientists and religious people alike make truth-claims based on extraordinary
experiences that may be accessed by only a select group of highly trained in-
dividuals, yet they maintain these truths are universal, throughout space and
time and for all possible subjects. For example, when probing the quantum
mechanical nature of elementary particles, the relativistic curvature of space-
time, or the multiple dimensions of string theory, physicists must resort to
pure mathematics. The more physicists probe into the nature of phenomena
existing in external space, the more they describe them in terms of quantitative
abstractions that are experienced in the internal space of the mind. When they
try to explain their insights to nonmathematicians, they can do so only roughly
and by using metaphors. Likewise, the more contemplatives probe into the
nature of phenomena existing in the internal space of the mind, the more they
describe them in terms of qualitative abstractions, which also exist in the in-
ternal space of the mind. In their writings one finds theories of multiple di-
mensions of consciousness,^23 but when they try to explain their insights to
noncontemplatives, they must also resort to metaphors, which convey only
rough approximations of their discoveries.
The language of mathematicians is untranslatable into any other language,
and the same is true of the language of contemplatives. Although one math-
ematical system may be translated into the equations of another system, none
can be translated into the experiences or concepts of the general lay public.
The same is true of contemplative writings. In some cases one contemplative
system may translate well into the language of another, but a sophisticated