Negligence 231The usefulness of the defendant’s actions tends to be an important factor in cases where the
defendant acted in an emergency.
Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 has attempted to clarify the standard of care
expected, and in particular to counter the ‘compensation culture’ idea that any activity
which involves any degree of danger could lead to liability. It provides that when con-
sidering whether a defendant should have taken steps to meet a standard of care, a court
should consider two matters: first, whether requiring those steps to be taken would prevent
a desirable activity from being undertaken at all, or prevent it from being undertaken to
a particular extent or in a particular way; second, whether requiring those steps to be
taken would discourage people from doing things connected with a desirable activity.
This section does not change the law but codifies it, so that people become aware that some
risks are justified. When children play football, for example, there is a risk of injury. But the
playing of football is a desirable activity. If a child is injured whilst playing a football match
at school, a court will not find that the duty of care which the school owed is breached
merely because the school could have banned football and therefore avoided any risk of
injury. As the position is now contained in a statute, rather than in case law, it is hoped that
fewer unsuitable cases will go to court. It is also hoped that the general public will become
aware that the desirability of some activities outweighs the risk involved. Section 1 also
applies to statutory duties if they involve a standard of care, as the Occupiers’ Liability Acts
1957 and 1984 do. These acts are considered later in this chapter.
Section 2 of the Compensation Act 2006 provides that the mere fact that a person apolo-
gises or offers treatment or some other help does not amount to an admission of negligence
or breach of a statutory duty.
HeldThe duty was breached. A and B (the likelihood of harm and the potential serious-
ness of injury) were much greater than C and D (the cost of preventing the accident and the
usefulness of working without goggles).Watt vHertfordshire County Council (1954) (Court of Appeal)A fire station received a call that a woman was trapped under a heavy vehicle about 250
yards away from the station. The officer in charge set off immediately, ordering that a lorry
should be loaded with heavy lifting gear, which was normally carried on a special vehicle,
and that the lorry should follow as soon as possible. The lifting gear was loaded on to the
back of the lorry, but it could not be lashed down. When the lorry braked, one of the firemen
travelling with the lifting gear was injured.
HeldThe fire authority was not negligent. The risk to the firemen had to be balanced
against the purpose to be achieved.
Denning LJ said: ‘If this accident had happened in a commercial enterprise without any
emergency, there could be no doubt that the [fireman] would succeed. But the commercial
end to make profit is very different from the human end to save life and limb. The saving of
life and limb justifies the taking of considerable risk.’