Alagha 459(the current secretary general) and Sayyid Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid (the
current head of Hizbullah’s Political Council), were Amal members who
had become disillusioned with its compromising attitude and partici-
pation in the Lebanese cabinet.^3 They had abandoned Amal and joined
ranks with existing Islamic Shi‘i groups—including members of Hizb al-
Da‘wa al-Islamiyya [The Islamic Call] and Ittihad al-Lubnani li-l-Talaba
al-Muslimin [The Lebanese Union of Muslim Students]^4 as well as inde-
pendent active Islamic figures and clerics—to establish Hizbullah as an
Islamic jihādῑ movement against the Israeli occupation, with the material
support of Iran and backing from Syria.^5 These groups became the back-
bone of Hizbullah, including, most importantly, its “resistance identity.”
Unprecedented accomplishments in directing several blows against the
Israeli army gained Hizbullah a wide reputation and credibility among its
constituencies. Later achievements in addressing socio-economic griev-
ances resulting from the Israeli occupation also helped Hizbullah gain a
solid footing among the grassroots Shi‘i population.
ntil the mid 1980s, Hizbullah mainly operated clandestinely. U
However, on 16 February 1985, the group publicly revealed its political
manifesto in an “Open Letter” that disclosed its religio-political ideol-
ogy, thus beginning a direct engagement in Lebanese political life.^6 In
the Open Letter, Hizbullah advocated a radical-militant approach that
regarded the Lebanese political system as infidel and the Lebanese gov-
ernment as apostate, to be uprooted through revolution and replaced by
the rule of Islam. Hizbullah’s commitment to an Islamic revolution in
Lebanon and the creation of an Islamic state—and its strict application
of Ayatollah Khomeini’s notion of wilāyat al-faqῑh [guardianship of the
jurisprudent]—backfired domestically, alienating Hizbullah from other
political and social movements and exiling it from the Lebanese political
sphere to a great extent.
ough the 1980s, Hizbullah remained a (closed) sectarian Thr
social movement with a limited following, however one that developed
a strong internal organization and institutional infrastructure. During
this period Hizbullah collected religious capital (through adherence to
the Iranian marji‘iyya, or authority of emulation); political and symbolic
capital (through the fighting and “martyrdom” operations of the Islamic
Resistance against Israel, both in the south and in the Biqa‘ region in the