476 Resisting Publics
n his 17 August Friday prayer speech, Ayatullah Fadlallah, a prom- I
inent Shi‘i cleric, warned that the political crisis was so severe that the
issue was not about Lebanon’s future but rather about its very existence.
Fadlallah stated that Lebanon had become a battleground for regional and
international struggles, struggles that had rendered the Lebanese pawns.^72
The Maronite Patriarch reiterated the same concern in his 19 August
Sunday sermon.^73 The fear was that if civil war erupted, it would lead to
the total destruction of Lebanon since—unlike the 1975–1990 civil war, in
which the fighting was mainly between Muslims and Christians—at this
point the whole country was polarized and both camps (8 March and 14
March) included parties from all religious denominations and sectarian
affiliations.
Conclusion: The waxing and waning of power
Hizbullah’s bid for national power had laid the cornerstone for a new
phase in which it sought to dominate the political arena and reformu-
late the political system [al-mushāraka wa-i‘ādāt intāj al-s.ult.a]—all under
a slogan of openness and partnership. But in the end, after eighteen
months of a wavering political stalemate, the cabinet decided to confront
Hizbullah for the first time. After a long meeting on 6 May 2008 that lasted
till the early hours of the morning, the cabinet denounced Hizbullah’s
telecommunications network as illegitimate and an “onslaught against the
state’s sovereignty and its financial resources.” The cabinet announced that
it was going to bring to justice all those who participated or were involved
in deploying this network, which was tantamount to issuing an arrest
warrant for Nasrallah. The cabinet also dismissed the pro-Hizbullah and
pro-Amal head of security at Beirut Airport, who had been serving in that
post since 2000, Lebanese Army General Wafiq Shuqayr.
n response, Hizbullah stormed and occupied West Beirut (where I
most government ministries and institutions are located) by military force
in the night hours of 8 into 9 May. The party had managed to strike a
“silent consensus” deal with the Lebanese Army not to interfere in the cri-
sis. (At least 60% of the Army were Shi‘i, and it was made up of eighteen
confessional groups, so becoming involved in the clashes would have led