76 Philosophical Frames
sense” turned “good.”^37 “Good sense” is what enables “common sense” to
metamorphose into the pursuit of “common good.” We should deduce
that according to Gramsci a pursuit of common good can only succeed if
a popular philosophy, also in the form of religion, becomes self-conscious
and hegemonic. Without this step, common sense will be at the service of
the hegemonic culture of the dominant classes.
hat makes this possible is that common sense facilitates the con-W
nection between the two extremes of high culture and popular culture,
and, being mobile and flexible, continually transforms and enriches itself
with new ideas to shape the range of maxims through which principles
are translated into moral guides for everyday life—a back-and-forth pen-
dulum between universality and local, common knowledge.^38 Yet because
neither religion nor the larger body of common sense in which it partici-
pated was reducible to a unity and coherence in either the individual or
collective conscience, Gramsci remained skeptical about the possibility
that religion and common sense could provide the cultural material for
constructing an intellectual order leading the proletariat to cultural and
political hegemony.^39
n the final analysis, Gramsci’s diagnosis of the predicament of the I
peasant masses of southern Italy was quite pessimistic. For Gramsci the
only source of optimism lay in voluntary action, ultimately culminating
in organized, revolutionary political action. This understanding of the
relation between common and good sense will become important when
we turn to Foucault’s analysis of the Iranian Revolution, a case where
religion did accomplish the transformation into good sense, precisely
because of what Foucault saw as the unity of will of the masses. As we will
see, for Foucault religion stopped being common sense in Iran, at least for
a short while.
et if Gramsci saw religion as “a need of the spirit,” and even a key Y
to the needed “public spirit,” he was echoing Marx’s belief—and anticipat-
ing Foucault’s—that religion is the spirit of a spiritless time.^40 A meta-
morphosed religion has the potential to unify the will of the masses, and
as such is central to executing the philosophy of praxis. It is key to the
“intellectual and moral reformation” that must precede any revolution.
Reinterpreting Gramscian categories, one could dare to say that religion
itself—not as a theoretical activity but as a stimulus to action and a source