The Language of Argument

(singke) #1
2 1 6

C H A P T E R 1 0 ■ C a u s a l R e a s o n i n g

In fact, the driver may not be in a position to answer this question straight
off, but his thinking will be guided by the causal generalization that igniting
nitroglycerin can cause a dangerous explosion.
So a similar pattern arises for both causal explanation and causal predic-
tion. These inferences contain two essential elements:


  1. The facts in the particular case. (For example, the car stopped and the
    gas gauge reads empty; or I just put a pint of nitroglycerin in the gas
    tank of my Maserati, and I am about to turn the ignition key.)

  2. Certain causal generalizations. (For example, cars do not run without
    gas, or nitroglycerin explodes when ignited.)
    The basic idea is that causal inferences bring particular facts under causal
    generalizations.
    This shows why causal generalizations are important, but what exactly
    are they? Although this issue remains controversial, here we will treat them
    as a kind of general conditional. A general conditional has the following form:
    For all x, if x has the feature F, then x has the feature G.
    We will say that, according to this conditional, x’s having the feature F is a
    sufficient condition for its having the feature G; and x’s having the feature G is
    a necessary condition for its having the feature F.
    Some general conditionals are not causal. Neither of these two general
    conditionals expresses a causal relationship:
    If something is a square, then it is a rectangle.
    If you are eighteen years old, then you are eligible to vote.
    The first conditional tells us that being a square is sufficient for being a
    rectangle, but this is a conceptual (or a priori) relationship, not a causal one.
    The second conditional tells us that being eighteen years old is a sufficient
    condition for being eligible to vote. The relationship here is legal, not causal.
    Although many general conditionals are not causal, all causal conditionals
    are general, in our view. Consequently, if we are able to show that a causal con-
    ditional is false just by virtue of its being a general conditional, we will have
    refuted it. This will serve our purposes well, for in what follows we will be
    largely concerned with finding reasons for rejecting causal generalizations.
    It is important to weed out false causal generalizations, because they can
    create lots of trouble. Doctors used to think that bloodletting would cure dis-
    ease. They killed many people in the process of trying to heal them. Thus,
    although we need causal generalizations for getting along in the world, we
    also need to get them right. We will be more likely to succeed if we have
    proper principles for testing and applying such generalizations.
    In the past, very elaborate procedures have been developed for this
    purpose. The most famous set of such procedures was developed by John
    Stuart Mill and has come to be known as Mill’s methods.^1 Though inspired


97364_ch10_ptg01_215-238.indd 216 15/11/13 10:48 AM


some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materiallyCopyright 201^3 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights,
affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
Free download pdf