The Language of Argument

P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e a s o n i n g

4 8 3

highlights some of the practical and empirical problems, rather than solves

them. It may, however, resolve some of the philosophical, and particularly,

some of the metaphysical problems, and reveal how intimate are the connec-

tions between the remaining philosophical problems and the practical ones.

1. Explain the deep self views of freedom and responsibility from Frankfurt,
   Watson, and Taylor, as Wolf describes them.


2. What problems does Wolf raise for the deep self views of Frankfurt, Watson,
   and Taylor? How could Frankfurt, Watson, and Taylor best respond to
   Wolf?


3. Explain Wolf’s example of JoJo. What point is she trying to make with this
   example? Does the example succeed in your opinion? Why or why not?


4. Does Wolf’s sane deep-self theory really solve the problems raised by her
   example of JoJo? How or why not?


5. What exactly does Wolf mean by “sanity”? How is her notion related to
   what people usually mean by sanity and insanity? Are normal people like
   us sane by Wolf’s standards? Why or why not?


6. Wolf distinguishes actually understanding and appreciating the world from
   being able to understand and appreciate the world. How can we draw this
   distinction in practice, such as in a legal trial?


7. Wolf admits, “The sane deep-self view does not, then, resolve all of the
   philosophical problems connected to the topics of free will and responsibil-
   ity.” Which problems does it not resolve?

Discussion Questions

A DEFENSE OF FREE WILL SKEPTICISM^2

by Derk Pereboom

1. Outline of Hard Incompatibilism.
   Spinoza maintained that due to certain general facts about the nature of the
   universe, we human beings do not have the sort of free will required for
   moral responsibility. I agree. More exactly, he argues that it is because causal
   determinism is true that we lack this sort of free will; he is thus a hard deter-
   minist. By contrast, the position I defend is agnostic about causal determin-
   ism. I contend, like Spinoza, that we would not have the sort of free will
   required for moral responsibility if causal determinism were true, but also
   that indeterministic theories do not significantly improve the prospects for
   this sort of free will. Consequently, we need to take seriously the verdict that
   we lack the sort of free will required for moral responsibility. I call the result-
   ing skeptical view about free will hard incompatibilism. In addition, I argue

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