102 Roger Finke and Rodney Stark
#3: To the degree that deregulation of the religious economy occurs in a previously
highly regulated economy, the society will be desacralized.When the state, for
whatever reasons, no longer ensures claims of exclusive legitimacy by the monopoly
faith, desacralization must ensue. Where there are a plurality of religious firms, no
one of them is sufficiently potent to sustain sacralization.^2 Nor can sacralization be
sustained by some coalition of competing religious firms, for any statements emitted
by such a group must be limited to vague generalizations to which all can assent.
Perhaps such is the stuff of “civil religion” (Bellah 1967), but it is not the stuff of
sacralization. But then, neither is it necessarily a symptom of religious decline.
Desacralization, as we define it, is identical to what many scholars have referred to as
the macro form ofsecularization. So long as this definition of secularization is limited to
the differentiation of religious and other primary social institutions, we accept it. How-
ever, few who apply the term secularization to institutional differentiation are able to
resist linking desacralization to a general decline in individual religious commitment
(the micro version of secularization), because they are convinced that only religious
monopolies can sustain belief. We take the entirely opposite position. Our model of re-
ligious economies holds that the demise of religious monopolies and the deregulation
of religious economies will result in a generalincreasein individual religious commit-
ment, as more firms (and more motivated firms) gain free access to the market.
As the examples on Latin America and the United States will illustrate, there is
often a substantial lag between changes in regulation and changes in sacralization.
A former religious monopoly supported by the state often retains cultural standing,
as the legitimate and normal church, long after losing much of its temporal power.
This cultural standing will initially prevent the acceptance of new religions, slowing
the development of religious pluralism, and will allow the once monopoly religion
to retain a strong foothold in education, politics, and other institutions. Moreover,
before competing religions can challenge the dominant religion’s close ties to such
institutions, they first must capture a sizeable segment of the religious market. This
organizational growth requires the gradual development of social ties and a cultural
acceptance often involving several generations. Realize that if a group begins with one
thousand members and grows at the astounding rate of 10 percent per year, it will need
seventy-five years to reach one million members. Thus, following the deregulation of
a religious economy, there are often lengthy delays before a new supply of religions
flourish and the extensive process of desacralization ensues.
Religious Competition and Commitment
Yet, if monopolies are effective in infusing the public arena with religious symbolism
and supporting majestic and well-funded religious buildings, they are ill-equipped for
mobilizing the commitment and support of the people. Herein lies the key distinction
between the old and new paradigm. We argue that the founders were entirely wrong
about the harmful effects of religious competition. Rather than eroding the plausibility
(^2) This may well be the reason that sociologists regard religious monopolies as the basis for strong
faith and pluralism as inevitably eroding faith. If Peter Berger’s notion of the “sacred canopy” is
equated with the sacralization of societies, then it is true that a single canopy is necessary, and
that multiple canopies don’t suffice. But, when the sacred canopy line of thought is construed
to mean that personal piety is more abundant under monopoly faith, that is clearly wrong.