The Dynamics of Religious Economies 109
The final proposition stressed that conflict can substitute for competition in gen-
erating religious commitment. When serving as the organizational basis for resisting
oppression or outside threats, a monopoly firm can generate very high levels of com-
mitment. Once the religious firm is no longer the vehicle for social conflict, however,
the firms will display the typical inefficiencies of a monopoly faith. We offered the
example of Quebec, but Ireland, Poland, and many Islamic nations also could illustrate
how conflict can substitute for competition.
This chapter offers only a brief introduction to the dynamics of religious economies.
Along with ignoring the micro (individual decision making) and the organizational
foundations, we have lacked the space needed to review many other key propositions
on religious economies (Stark and Finke 2000). For example, what explains the over-
or undersupply of religious firms in various market niches? What factors determine the
formation of new religious groups and the level of tension they hold with the socio-
cultural environment? How is a group’s tension related to market niches and organi-
zational growth? Yet, even with this brief introduction, we have tried to illustrate the
power of the religious market structure, or supply-side changes, for explaining religious
variation and change.