Historicizing the Secularization Debate 111
both historically and sociologically. This means studying the ebbs and flows of sec-
ularity over thelongue duree, and examining the interactions between religious and
nonreligious actors and institutions.
THE RECEIVED ORTHODOXY: CLASSICAL SECULARIZATION THEORY
The roots of classical secularization theory can be traced back to the early nineteenth
century and the writings of Henri Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte.^1 Although their
analyses differed somewhat in the details, both argued that human history passes
through a series of distinct stages, in which the power and plausibility of traditional
religion are gradually and irreversibly undermined by the growing influence of the state
and of science (Saint-Simon 1969; Comte 1830–42/1969). In their view, modernity and
religion don’t mix. This view was later echoed in the writings of sociology’s “found-
ing fathers” – Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. While each viewed Christianity somewhat
differently, all agreed that its significance was definitely on the wane. This became the
dominant view within Anglo-American sociology as well. With the notable exception
of Parsons (1963), postwar sociologists of religion all agreed that the public influence
of religion was shrinking, and many thought that private belief itself was bound to
decline or even disappear (e.g., Berger 1967; Luckmann 1963). During the 1960s, the
“secularization thesis” was integrated into “modernization theory” and became one of
its central axioms. As societies modernized, they became more complex, more ratio-
nalized, more individualistic – and less religious. Or so the argument went. Today, of
course, modernization theory has few adherents – except among sociologists of religion.
While the rest of the discipline has moved on to other approaches, present-day defend-
ers of secularization theory continue to use the old modernization-theoretic framework
(e.g., Dobbelaere 1981; Wilson 1982; Bruce 1996), a framework that still bears strong
resemblances to the classical theory of secularization propounded by Comte and Saint-
Simon.
From the perspective of classical secularization theory (henceforth: CST), then, the
decline in orthodox Christian beliefs and practices in most parts of the West is inter-
preted as a part of a more general decline in the power of religious institutions and
ideas and explained with reference to various social processes (e.g., differentiation, ra-
tionalization, industrialization, and urbanization), which are loosely bundled together
with the rubric of “modernization.” As social institutions become more differentiated
and social life becomes more rationalized, the argument goes, religious institutions and
beliefs lose their power and plausibility.
In support of these claims, defenders of secularization theory usually point to two
well-documented developments. The first is the establishment and expansion of secular
institutions in the fields of social provision, education, moral counseling, and other
fields of activity once dominated by the church, a development they characterize as a
“loss of social functions.” The second is the long-term decline in orthodox Christian
practice and belief noticed by contemporary observers beginning in the late nineteenth
century and subsequently confirmed in opinion polls throughout the postwar period.
The fact that these declines have been especially pronounced among industrial workers
(^1) For a more detailed discussion of the development of secularization theory, see especially
Tschannen 1992.