Religious Social Movements in the Public Sphere 327
language clearly puts American history and destiny in a divine storyline (Williams and
Demerath 1991).
And yet, it is arguable that narrow sectarian language has receded as a public lan-
guage, particularly as a public political language. Morality and moral language is vi-
tally important, it is the essence of our civil religious understandings. But it must be,
at least on the surface, nonsectarian, inclusive, and embracing (note that in President
George W. Bush’s 2001 inaugural address he mentioned “church,” “synagogue,” and
“mosque”). Indeed, there is some expectation that even a civil religious language of
critique – calling the nation to account for its lapses – should be framed in positive
and optimistic terms. In that sense, our public religious language has an important
debt to the idea of “progress”; that is, that we can overcome any limitations of the past
and that the future will be more just and moral than the present. What this means is
that even in those situations in which many people do not agree with a movement’s
stated position on an issue, they will view favorably the religious language in which it
is pitched, so long as it is the “right” type of public religious language.
Thus, religiously based social movements must strike a delicate balance in their
relations with the media and the general public. To the extent that movements want to
reach potential recruits, raise money from sympathetic constituents, and goad people
into action, fiery rhetoric full of clearly sectarian language may be the best tool. I am
convinced this accounts for much of the popularity of “culture wars” rhetoric (Williams
1997b). But to the extent that movements want to persuade bystanders, lure elected
officials to their positions, or participate in institutionalized public processes, they need
a civil religious language that maximizes similarities, plays to moderation, and speaks
in general abstractions. Overplaying one side of this balance can leave an SMO either
without fervent constituents or without greater political influence. The differences in
media presentation between the early years of the Moral Majority, and the direction
taken by the Christian Coalition under Ralph Reed, illustrate how each direction has
potential pitfalls. The sectarian message of the early Moral Majority, particularly one
episode when a Baptist minister told an audience that God does not hear the prayers
of Jews (Kater 1982), alienated many Americans, and equated the Moral Majority name
with intolerance. Despite protests to the contrary, the group had trouble shaking the
public impression that it was really a narrow segment of culturally and religiously
fundamentalist Protestants. As director of the Christian Coalition, on the other hand,
Ralph Reed used to speak generically of “people of faith,” potentially opening the door
to ecumenism and civil religion.
All SMOs require the media to get the message out, but less formally organized
groups need the media more. They have fewer symbols and rituals with which to de-
velop collective identity, fewer networks for recruiting members, and fewer material
incentives to offer potential recruits. Lacking regularized organizational and political
routines, they must provide moral shocks and dramatic public actions to gain media
attention and galvanize sympathizers into action. The coin of their political realm is
public exposure and moral indignation.
Media demands for innovation and conflict give these informal – and often more
radical – groups a leg up. There is a proliferation of cable talk shows that trade in
confrontation and bumper-sticker logic. Moderation is not rewarded in these settings
and the drive to garner attention and distinction pushes advocates to stridency and
uncompromising moral positions. That this avenue to influence is self-limited by the