330 Rhys H. Williams
passion when a movement needs to make some of the compromise necessary to partic-
ipate in pluralist politics? If politics is a fundamentally moral endeavor for movement
members, isn’t a political compromise actually a moral compromise? How does one
“deal” when the only acceptable moral position is complete victory? Indeed, studies
of religiously based movements repeatedly show the extent to which collective action
stumbles or struggles once the terrain moves from public expression of moral outrage
to crafting public policy (see Demerath and Williams 1992; Williams and Demerath
1991).
So there becomes a tricky balancing act between organizational coordination, polit-
ical effectiveness, and ideological purity. Organization rigor and political involvement
without sufficient attention to ideological standards appear too much like “politics as
usual” to members and the movement looks more interested in power than in moral
reform to bystander publics. In other words, the movement looks so much like any sec-
ular political effort that it loses much of the benefit of its religious resources. However,
overly strident moralist ideology, unconnected to practical considerations or harnessed
to organized cadres of adherents, can produce either absolutist politics or empty and
publicly disregarded rhetoric. In other words, the latter case appears either to be the im-
practical meddlings of preachers into the “real world” about which they are ill-informed
or a religious crusade that is a threat to public pluralism.
This dilemma – between a specific, but often exclusionary, sectarian faith and an
open, pluralistic, but often bland or generic public religion – is a core concern to con-
temporary society. How does one have a truly “public” sphere if it is built only on the
narrow, partial languages of particular religious faiths? By contrast, how can a society
have a truly inclusive public life if the languages of religious faiths are not allowed in
debates about public policy? Habermas (1987, 1989) has considered these problems at
length and is, in the end, pessimistic about religion’s capacity to contribute to “rational
discourse” in public life. Religion’s reliance on revealed truth, and its claims to ultimate
and final authority, makes it a cultural system that is incompatible with the needs of an
inclusive, public sphere. Yet Dillon’s (1999a) study of pro-change Catholics shows that
not all religion is of a single cloth. Some forms of religious language and thinking are
quite open to reason, to reform, and to negotiating the ways in which society should be
arranged. The ultimacy of religious truth, for these faithful people, does not mandate
any particular social arrangements. Thus, their religion can indeed inform a lively and
vibrant public dialogue within society (see also Hart 2001).
In the end, many religiously based movements succeed in navigating the twin
dilemmas of ideological purity and worldly involvement and efficacy. This is testi-
mony to the dedication and resourcefulness of activists, as well as evidence for the
deep legitimacy religion has in American culture. Religion has a presumption of “dis-
interestedness” and a resonance with the lives and motivations of many people in our
society. Many religiously based social movement efforts turn out to be ephemeral and
unsuccessful, showing some of the challenges that religion faces when trying to influ-
ence public life in the contemporary world. By contrast, many of these efforts emerge
from the margins of American society and its political scene – they are the vehicles
of people who often do not have the resources to influence public life in other ways.
Thus, religion is often the best way for disadvantaged populations to make their voices
heard. If for no other reason, religion, organization, ideology, and activism in the public
sphere will be elements of American life indefinitely.