Civil Society and Civil Religion as Mutually Dependent 351
discourse leaves a gnawing sense of discomfort. After all, isn’t this the same society that
is so often chided for its conformity? Isn’t there a difference between individualismas
a cultural value and individuationas a structural circumstance? Isn’t it at least possible
that some of our societal uneasiness here is due to the presence of one without the other,
that is, individuation without the kind of individualism that makes us comfortable
with the result?
Meanwhile, Durkheim (1893/1997) and his French predecessor, Alexis de Toc-
queville (1831/1969), would recognize the emphasis on voluntary associations and
group affiliations that mediate between the individual and the nation. Both gave spe-
cial attention to religion, and de Tocqueville to American churches in particular. But
this has not been as true of recent civil society theorists. Many have neglected religion
altogether even though it is the single largest source of organizations and associations
constituting American civil society (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Putnam 2000). That is
not true of Robert Putnam’s compelling moan over “Bowling Alone.” Putnam (2000)
argues that American democracy, civic virtues and social capital are all rooted in a wide
variety of shared activities that are now tragically waning – including organized bowl-
ing leagues but also churches, trade unions, and other voluntary associations. The
thesis has launched a flotilla of critical responses, many of which argue that there has
been a shift more in thekindof social participation than in the overallamount(e.g.,
Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Edwards and Foley 2001; Wilson 2001). A very recent study
of religion in Indianapolis, IN, suggests that the social capital engendered by churches
has much less significance for participation in the wider community and its politics
than Putnam and others have supposed (Farnsley et al. forthcoming)
As Paxton (1999) suggests, it is worth pausing to wonder whether declining asso-
ciations with their plummeting “social capital” are the cause or the consequence of
a loss of civility? As with the related issue of individualism versus individuation, one
might also ask if the structural ebbing precedes or follows the cultural shift? Meanwhile,
Putnam’s concerns cue yet another aspect of Western civil society that is related, namely,
its source in ascetic Protestantism.
Virtually every civil historian acknowledges that the “Protestant Ethic” so empha-
sized by Durkheim’s German contemporary, Max Weber (1904–5/1958), was as impor-
tant to the spirit of political civility as to the spirit of capitalism. The liberal stress on
individuals seeking salvation through their own actions accounts for at least some of
the “individualisms” among our “habits of the heart” (Bellah et al. 1985).
However, a less-celebrated legacy of Protestantism may be equally important;
namely, its emphasis on congregational solidarity. A major secret of Protestantism’s
early success was that it too provided a cure for its own disease; on the one hand, it
promoted the curse of individualism and, on the other hand, it provided the remedy
in a new kind of congregational involvement. Loneliness before God can be countered
by the support available from one’s fellow congregants.
Today the link between Protestant “civil society” and American civility is more
complex. It is even arguable that religion’s impact has changed from positive to negative
as it has taken on a newly uncivil tone. Even though the decline in liberal mainline
religion has been partially balanced by an increase in conservative evangelical religion,
some see only the former as an authentic staple of civil society and source of social
capital (Putnam 2000). But surely it is too simple to plot the rise of incivility and social
withdrawal as a function of the decline of liberal and the surge of conservative religion.